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THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMS AND THE REBALANCING
OF LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
IN CANADA, 1982-1997©
By JAMES B. KELLY*

This article presents a statistical analysis of the first 352
Charter of Rights and Freedoms decisions by the
Supreme Court of Canada between 1982 and 1997. The
author argues that the emerging approach to Charter
review by the Supreme Court of Canada has led to a
rebalancing of liberal constitutionalism and to a
reconciliation between Charter rights and federalism.
This stands in stark contrast to the highly activist
approach to Charter review detected in studies by
Morton, Russell, and Withey and, to a lesser extent, by
Morton, Russell, and Riddell. Several factors illustrate
the rebalancing of liberal constitutionalism in Canada.
First, the Court's support for the rights claimant has
stabilized at 34 per cent. Second, Charterreview now
focuses on the conduct of public officials; statutes and
regulations constitute a declining portion of Charter
challenges. This has important implications for the
relationship between Charterreview and federalism, as
the centralization thesis lacks a consistent empirical
basis to be a true characterization of the Charterseffect
on provincial autonomy. Finally, the Court during
Lamer C.J.C.'s tenure emerged as a centrist Court, as
most judges fall within a narrow range of the Court's
support rate for the rights claimant in both criminal and
non-criminal cases.

Cet article pr6sente une analyse statistique des
premieres 352 d6ecisions prises par la Cour Supreme du
Canada entre 1982 et 1997. L'auteur argumente, en
particulier, que ]a nouvelle approche de la Cour
Supreme du Canada quant un examen fond6 sur la
Chatie a men6 Aun r6quilibrage du constitutionalisme
liberal et Aune r6conciliation entre les droits garantis
par ]a Charte et le f~ddralisme. Cela contraste
violemment avec l'approche hautement activiste i
l'gard d'un examen fond6 sur ]a Charte qui se r vle
dans les 6tudes de Morton, de Russell, et de Withey, et
dans une moindre mesure, de Morton, de Russell, et de
Ridell. Plusieurs facteurs illustrent le r6quilibrage du
constitutionnalisme libdral au Canada. D'abord, le
soutien de la Cour pour les requ~rants des droits s'est
stabilis6 A34 pour cent. Ensuite, lexamen fonda sur la
Charte est axle sur le comportement des
fonctionnaires; les codes et les r~glements constituent
une partie ddcroissante des d~fis que rencontre la
Charte. Cela a des cons6quences importantes pour la
relation entre I'examen fond6 sur la Charte et le
f~dralisme, 6tant donn6 que ]a th~se de la
centralisation manque une base empirique solide pour
6tre une vraie caract~risation de 'effet de la Chartesur
l'autonomie provinciale. Enfin, la Cour de Lamer est
apparue comme une Cour centriste, comme la plupart
des justices se trouve dans les limites 6troites du taux
de soutien de ]a Cour pour le requrant de droits, dans
les deux cas d'une affaire jug~e criminelle ou noncriminelle.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The judicialization of politics in Canada is typically associated
with the introduction of the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms.1
In effect, this position suggests that the Charter has transferred
significant decisionmaking authority from democratic actors to the
courts, and increased the scope of judicial review as a result. 2 This
observation, however, must be qualified in the Canadian context. The
heightened level of intergovernmental conflict in the 1970s and the
increased role of the Supreme Court of Canada suggests that the
judicialization of politics was a development that predated the Charter.
Rather than being a process that affected all aspects of the constitutional

1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11 [hereinafter Charter]. For a discussion of this position, see S.I. Smithey, "The Effects of the
Canadian Supreme Court's Charter Interpretation on Regional and Intergovernmental Tensions in
Canada" (1996) 26 Publius: J. Fed. 83 at 83-85.
2 See T. Vallinder, "The Judicialization of Politics-A Worldwide Phenomenon: Introduction"
(1994) 15 Int'l. Pol. Sci. Rev. 91.
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order, judicialization prior to 1982 was limited to the politics of
federalism. The introduction of the Charter did not invite the
judicialization of politics in Canada, but broadened the potential impact
of the phenomenon to all aspects of the constitutional system in Canada.
This is a significant development nonetheless, but it must be noted that
the judicialization of politics is an historical feature of Canadian
federalism. The evolution of Canadian federalism is incomplete without
an account of the role played by the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council and, after 1949, by the Supreme Court of Canada.3 Indeed, the
judicialization of politics may be more accurately thought of as an
inevitable outcome in systems that rely on the institutions of interstate
federalism to resolve political conflict than being solely the consequence
of entrenched rights and freedoms established by the Charter.
The objective of this article is to survey the contours of the
judicialization of politics in Canada and to evaluate whether the political
terrain has changed so as to lend credence to the claim that the Supreme
Court has used the Charterto promote a confrontational or deferential
relationship between the judicial and legislative branches of government.
In their 1994 study, F.L. Morton, Peter Russell, and Troy Riddell
undertook a statistical analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada's first
195 Charter decisions between 1982 and 1992.4 The intention of their
study was to build on previous descriptive analyses of the Charter
conducted by the authors5 and to analyze important trends in the Court's
jurisprudence. The authors acknowledged that descriptive analyses of
the Court's use of the Charterwere not a substitute for jurisprudential
analysis. However, such an exercise was considered useful because it
could "generate hypotheses about the impact the Court is having on the
legal system and about the orientation of its judges." 6 This article builds
on the work of Morton, Russell, and Riddell, and includes data for the
1993-1997 period. The total number of cases in the data set is 352;7

3 See A.C. Cairns, "The Judicial Committee and Its Critics" (1971) 3 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 301.
4 See F.L. Morton, P.H. Russell & T. Riddell, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms: A Descriptive Analysis of the First Decade, 1982-1992" (1994) 5 N.J.C.L. 1.
5 See F.L. Morton, P.H. Russell & M.J. Withey, "The Supreme Court's First One Hundred
Charter of Rights Decisions: A Statistical Analysis" (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1.
6 P.H. Russell, "The Supreme Court in the 1980s: A Commentary on the S.C.R. Statistics"
(1992) 30 Osgoode Hall LJ.771 [hereinafter "Commentary on S.C.R. Statistics"].
7 Following the Morton, Russell, and Withey study, we have included in our data set all cases
dealing with constitutionally entrenched rights, not just those guaranteed by the Charter.Thus, we
have included cases dealing with denominational school rights in section 93 of the ConstitutionAct,
1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3,reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5 [hereinafter Constitution
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Delgamuukw v. British Columbia8 is the last Supreme Court decision
included in the study.
This article is divided into two parts. The first part summarizes
Morton, Russell, and Riddell's statistical analysis of the first 195 Charter
decisions between 1982 and 1992. Significant trends in the Court's
jurisprudence, as well as the conclusions the authors draw concerning
the impact of the first 195 Charterdecisions on liberal constitutionalism
and federalism in Canada are outlined. The second part, the core of the
article, focuses on the 157 Charter cases delivered by the Supreme Court
between 1993 and 1997. For analytical purposes, this subset of cases will
be compared to trends identified by Morton, Russell, and Riddell.
The overall trend in the Court's jurisprudence suggests that the
Court has settled into a moderately activist approach to the Charter.This
important development suggests that the Court has changed its initial
approach to rights jurisprudence and its role as a policy actor under the
Charter.9 While the Court continues to nullify both provincial and
federal statutes under the Charter, the number of statutes challenged in
comparison to other kinds of Charterchallenges, such as challenges to
the conduct of public officials, was significantly reduced. In the 19931997 period, the Court focused its Charter scrutiny on the conduct of
public officials. By reducing the sources of conflict with the democratic
state, the Court enhanced the legitimacy of Charterreview and the role
of the Court in a liberal democracy. What is more important, the
movement away from directly challenging government legislation
reduces both the Charter's effect on Canadian federalism, and the
Court's apparent contribution to intergovernmental conflict. 10
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CHARTER, 1982-1992
Morton, Russell, and Riddell's 1994 study provided a statistical
analysis of the first 195 Charter decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada. The cases were described under two overarching themes: the
Act, 1867]; language rights in section 23 of the Manitoba Act, S.C. 1870, c. 3, section 133 of the

ConstitutionAct, 1867, and sections 16-23 of the Charter, and Aboriginal rights in section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter
ConstitutionAct, 1982]. When we refer to Chartercases in this study, we are using the expression to
refer to all cases involving the assertion of constitutional rights.
8 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [hereinafter Delgamuukw].

9 See M. Gold, "Of Rights and Roles: The Supreme Court and the Charter" (1989) 23 U.B.C.
L. Rev. 507 at 527.
10

See Smithey, supranote 1.
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Court's role as a policy actor under the Charter,and the Charter'seffect
on Canadian federalism. The composition of the Supreme Court's
caseload has changed significantly with the introduction of the Charter.
Patrick Monahan noted that the advent of the Charter has seen the
number of private law cases heard by the Supreme Court sharply
decline, while the number of constitutional law cases has steadily
increased.' 1 In their study, Morton, Russell, and Riddell found that
Charter cases accounted for 18 per cent of the Supreme Court's
workload between 1982 and 1992.12 In the first two years in which the
Court heard Charter appeals, the rights claimant was successful 64 per
cent of the time (9/14).13 The Court's early activism was argued to
account for the increased use of Charterarguments presented in lower
court cases. As well, this activism was said to facilitate a form of interest
4
group politics that saw groups increasingly adopt litigation strategies.'
This represents a sharp break with the Court's approach to rights and
freedoms before 1982. The rights claimant was successful 15 per cent of
the time under the Canadian Bill of Rights15 (5/34),16 and the Court
continued to approach the task of rights adjudication in a deferential
and restrained fashion.
The Court's initial activism did not continue past the first two
years of Charterdecisions. This point would find disagreement among
the study's authors. Morton, Russell, and Riddell found that the success
rate stabilized at 33 per cent for the 1982-1992 period,17 and Russell
elsewhere concluded that the Court adopted a moderately activist

I See P.J. Monahan, Politics and the Constitution:The Charter,Federalism,and the Supreme
Court of Canada (Agincourt, Ont.: Carswell, 1987) at 18-22 [hereinafter Politics and the
Constitution].
12 See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supranote 4 at 3, Table 1.

13 Ibid. at 5.
14 See F.L. Morton, "The Politics of Rights: What Canadians Should Know About the
American Bill of Rights" (1989) 1 Windsor Rev. L. & Soc. Iss. 61 at 68-70; F.L. Morton & R.

Knopff, "The Supreme Court as the Vanguard of the Intelligentsia: The Charter Movement as
Postmaterialistic Politics" in J. Ajzenstat, ed., CanadianConstitutionalism, 1791-1991 (Ottawa:

Canadian Study of Parliament Group, 1992) 37 at 58-59 [hereinafter "Supreme Court as
Vanguard"]; and C.P. Manfredi, JudicialPowerand the Charter: Canadaand the Paradoxof Liberal
Constitutionalism (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1993) at 171, 213, 216 [hereinafter Judicial
Powerand the Charter].
15

S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. Il.

16 See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supranote 4 at 5.
17 1bid.
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approach to the Charterafter an initial period of activism.18 David Beatty
has suggested that the change in the Court's approach to the Chartercan
be explained by personnel changes between 1982 and 1989. During this
period, no fewer than seven of the nine members of the Supreme Court
were named by Prime Minister Mulroney.19 For Beatty, this signified a
shift from the "liberal" judges appointed by Trudeau to the
"conservative" judges of Mulroney, where the conservative judges were
less inclined to support the rights claimant. 20 After considering Beatty's
explanation for the Court's changed approach to the Charter, Morton,
Russell, and Riddell found it an incomplete answer. They concluded
that, although there is a philosophical difference between the Trudeau
and Mulroney appointments, it is only evident in support levels between
criminal and equality rights cases, and that "the Mulroney appointments
have been slightly less supportive of the latter." 21
Instead, the 1994 study suggested that the change in the success
rate could be attributed to a "philosophical shift among some of the
same Justices who began the Court's Charterinterpretation in 1984."22
Morton, Russell, and Riddell pointed to the decline in the number of
unanimous Charterdecisions as evidence of a philosophical shift among
the judges appointed by Trudeau, and the emergence of a more
restrained approach to the Charter by the Court as a whole: "[T]he
simultaneous drop in the success rate and increase in dissenting opinions
after 1985 represents the working out of the tension between the activist
behaviour and legalistic pretence in the Court's earlier decisions." 23
Thus, the authors found little value in Beatty's contention that Mulroney
changed the ideological orientation of the Court by appointing
conservative judges, and questioned whether this could explain the
Court's movement away from a highly activist approach to the Charter.

18 See P.H. Russell, "The Supreme Court and the Charter: A Question of Legitimacy" in D.
Shugarman & R. Whitaker, eds., Federalismand PoliticalCommunity: Essays in Honour of Donald

Smiley (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 1989) 225 at 225-26, 228-29.
19 See D.M. Beatty, "A Conservative Court: The Politicization of Law" (1991) 41 U.T.L.J. 147

at 147-50 [hereinafter "Conservative Court"]. For a wider discussion of judicial appointments in the
Mulroney era, see P.H. Russell & J.S. Ziegel, "Federal Judicial Appointments: An Appraisal of the
First Mulroney Government's Appointments and the New Judicial Advisory Committees" (1991) 41
U.T.L.J. 4.
20 See D.M. Beatty, Talking Heads and the Supremes: The Canadian Production of

ConstitutionalReview (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at 43-45.
21 Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 6.
22 lbid.

231lbid. at 8.
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While the Charterclaimant was successful 33 per cent of the time
in the first 195 Charterdecisions, the authors detected differing levels of
support for Charterclaimants based on the type of rights claims raised
before the Supreme Court. Legal rights dominated Chartercases before
the Court, comprising 67 per cent (143/213) of the Court's Charter
docket. The support level for legal rights was 33 per cent (47/143) and
consistent with the overall success rate for rights claimants.24 At a distant
second were fundamental freedoms cases, representing 16 per cent
(35/213) of Chartercases.2 S However, the support rate for fundamental
freedoms was slightly below the Court average, at 29 per cent (10/35).
The 1994 study found that the highest levels of success were for
Aboriginal rights claims (100 per cent), but the Court addressed only a
single case in this area. The decision in R. v. Sparrow,26 however, was an
important victory for Aboriginal groups, as it established a generous test
for determining the existence of Aboriginal rights.
The equality rights in section 15 of the Chartercame into force in
1985, and it was feared that this section would pose the most serious
threat to federal diversity in Canada. Russell suggested that section
15(1) would have a centralizing effect because "many of the social,
economic and cultural policies to which the Supreme Court will apply
egalitarian norms have been subject to determination at the provincial
level." 27 Morton, Russell, and Riddell found that the Court addressed 16
equality rights cases between 1985 and 1992, and that the rights claimant
was successful 19 per cent of the time (3/16).28 The Andrews v. Law
Society (British Columbia)29 decision was a landmark ruling, in which the
Court stated that it would consider both the purpose and effect of
legislation when determining whether equality rights have been
violated 30 Indeed, the decision in Andrews was seen by its supporters
and by right-wing Charter critics as a decision that would facilitate
section 15(1) challenges by equality-seeking groups. It was suggested
that this decision provided leverage for legislative change for groups
24

Ibid. at 12, Table 5.

25 1bid

26 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
27 P.H. Russell, "The Effect of a Charter of Rights on the Policy-Making Role of Canadian

Courts" (1982) 25 Can. Pub. Admin. 26.
28 See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 12, Table 5.

29 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 [hereinafterAndrews].
30 See P.H. Russell, R. Knopff & F.L. Morton, eds., Federalism and the Charter: Leading

ConstitutionalDecisions (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989) at 585.
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seeking "preferential governmental treatment that either 'compensates'
them for past wrongs or 'promotes' equality in the future." 3 1 However,
the relatively few Supreme Court victories for "equality seekers" in
Morton, Russell, and Riddell's study brings into question the larger
effects attributed to section 15(1) by Chartercritics.
After reflecting on the composition of the Court's docket
between 1982 and 1992, an important question remains unanswered.
Clearly, if the Court's docket reflects its strengths and minimizes its
effect on federalism, why do Chartercritics contend that the Court has
used the Charter to create a confrontational relationship between the
judicial and legislative branches of government? The answer lies in the
object of Charter challenges between 1982 and 1992. Morton, Russell,
and Riddell's study found that the Supreme Court was more likely to
hear cases that challenged the constitutionality of government statutes
or regulations than it was to hear cases involving the conduct of public
officials3 2 The first 195 Supreme Court Charter decisions were based on
227 Charter challenges, as several cases involved challenges to two or
more of a statute, regulation, or conduct of a public official. Challenges
to statutes and regulations represented 54 per cent of Supreme Court
Charter cases (122/227) in the first decade of the Charter.33 The
importance of this trend for liberal constitutionalism should be readily
apparent. By largely challenging government legislation, this use of the
Charter places the Court in a competitive relationship with the
democratic state for control of the policy process. While the Court was
careful to select a docket that would reflect its strengths and enhance its
legitimacy, Morton, Russell, and Riddell concluded that this form of
competition can create a highly confrontational relationship between the
judicial and legislative branches of government, and can bring into
question the legitimacy of judicial review on Chartergrounds. 34
This conclusion has deeper implications in Canada because of
the federal character of the state and, as such, the Charter'slegitimacy is
also dependent on the effect of the Charteron Canadian federalism. The
1994 study found that the Court nullified a total of 41 statutes in whole

31 F.L. Morton, "Judicial Politics Canadian-Style: The Supreme Court's Contribution to the

Constitutional Crisis of 1992" in C. Cook, ed., Constitutional Predicament: Canada After the
Referendum of 1992 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994) 132 at 137 [hereinafter
"Judicial Politics Canadian-Style"].
32 See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 17-18.
33

Ibid. at 18, Table 6.

34

Ibid. at 18.
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or in part between 1982 and 1992.35 The Supreme Court nullified slightly
more federal (23) than provincial (18) statutes. Morton, Russell, and
Riddell found that provincial statutes were likely to be nullified on
broader substantive grounds, whereas federal statutes were likely to be
nullified on narrower procedural grounds. More to the point, provincial
statutes nullified on Chartergrounds typically had been more recently
enacted than federal statutes, and involved important areas of provincial
jurisdiction. In comparison, federal statutes that were nullified tended to
involve the Criminal Code36 and issues of procedural fairness. 3 7 The
difference between procedural and substantive nullification of statutes is
used by Morton, Russell, and Riddell to support their contention that
the Court has reduced the diversities of Canadian federalism. In a
separate study, Rainer Knopff and F.L. Morton concluded that the
higher rate of nullification on substantive grounds for provincial statutes
was having a standardizing effect on Canadian federalism.3 8
The 1994 study found that unanimous decisions during the 19821992 period had declined to 59 per cent, down significantly from 86 per
cent (12/14) during 1984 and 1985.39 In terms of the individual judges,
the 1994 study found that Wilson J. and Lamer C.J. remained the most
activist judges in supporting rights claimants, while L'Heureux-Dub6 and
McIntyre JJ. tended to favour judicial self-restraint. Morton, Russell, and
Riddell concluded that the effect of moving from a Trudeau to a
Mulroney Court did not result in a strong movement away from activism
but "a consolidation of the dominance of the Court's grey middle." 40 To
test the differing support levels by the individual judges for criminal and
non-criminal cases, the 1994 study created two subsets of Charter
decisions: a criminal rights index that consisted of 99 Charterdecisions,
and a "Court Party" index of 36 Charterdecisions. 41 The criminal rights
index focused on cases dealing with sections 7 to 14 of the Charter, and
the Ciminal Code or analogous federal criminal legislation. The Court
Party is a concept developed by Morton and Knopff to account for the
judicialization of politics and the mobilization of interests groups that
35 Ibid. at 19.
36 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-45.
37

See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 20.

38 See R. Knopff & F.L. Morton, CharterPolitics(Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson, 1992) at 378-79
[hereinafter CharterPolitics].
39 See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 33, Table 11.
40

Ibid. at 39.

41 Ibid. at 43.
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use litigation strategies to pursue policy objectives. 42 Both the criminal
rights and the Court Party indices had support levels above the overall
support level of 33 per cent for the first 195 Charter decisions. The 1994
study found that the Court supported the individual in 40 per cent of
criminal rights cases and in 53 per cent of Court Party cases. 43 Morton,
Russell, and Riddell found that several judges varied in support levels
from one index to the other. In particular, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. had the
second highest support rate for the Court Party (74 "per cent), yet the
second lowest support level for criminal rights (26 per cent). 44 Similarly,
Sopinka J. had the lowest support rate for the Court Party (31 per cent)
and the second highest support rate for criminal rights (60 per cent). 45
Morton, Russell, and Riddell stated that the results of the two indices
suggest that the Court is not divided into two ideological blocs, as most
judges "fall within a relatively narrow radius of the Court average, while
the outliers-Wilson, L'Heureux-Dub6, McIntyre, McLachlin, and
Sopinka-are somewhat isolated on different points of the periphery."46
As well, the study provided further evidence to dispute Beatty's thesis,
which attempted to account for the Court's movement away from
activism. The dominant centre bloc of judges was a combination of
Trudeau and Mulroney appointments, and the Trudeau appointments
were found to be more supportive of rights claimants only in the Court
Party index.
The Court's united approach to the Charter changed significantly
between 1982 and 1992. Instead of continuing its unanimous approach to
the Charter, once the Court ventured into unmarked territory the
consensus broke down over the proper balance between the Court's role
in liberal constitutionalism and an effective Charter. Morton, Russell,
and Riddell identified important trends in the Court's use of the Charter
that slowed down the judicialization of politics in Canada. First, the
overall level of activism declined between 1982 and 1992 to 33 per cent.
Second, the Court's initial restrictive use of the Charter's discretionary
powers showed sharp fluctuations during the first decade of Charter
42 See R. Knopff & F.L. Morton, "Canada's Court Party" in A.A. Peacock, ed., Rethinking the
Constitution:Perspectiveson CanadianConstitutionalRefonn, Interpretation,and Theory (Don Mills,

Ont.: Oxford University Press, 1996) 63 at 63-64 [hereinafter "Canada's Court Party"]. See also
Appendix 2, below.

43 See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 46, Table 18.
44

Ibid.

45 Although Morton, Russell, and Riddell refer to Sopinka J. as having had the second lowest
support rate for the Court Party, this appears to be in error.
46 Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 49-50.
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decisions. The Court was more willing to accept section 1 defences,
however, and reject motions to exclude evidence in the period following
its initial activist use of the Charter.The overall macro trends in the
Court's jurisprudence suggested that the Court's approach to the Charter
did not create a highly confrontational relationship between the judicial
and legislative branches of government.
The 1994 study shattered this illusion by looking at micro trends
within the Court's jurisprudence, and showing how these micro
developments complicate the relationship between judicial and
democratic actors during Charterreview. In particular, the Court placed
itself squarely in a confrontational relationship with the legislative
branch of government by focusing its jurisprudence on statutes and
regulations. While the tensions within liberal constitutionalism were
obscured by the overall statistics, the Court's focus on legislation
sharpened the effects of its rulings on the democratic arena. The tension
between the judicial and legislative branches of government is more
pronounced in Canada because of federalism. Indeed, while the macro
and micro developments within the Court's jurisprudence suggested
opposite effects on liberal constitutionalism, the Charter's effect on
federalism was unequivocally negative. 47 Morton, Russell, and Riddell's
statistical analysis demonstrated the Charter's ability to undermine
federal diversity and, in particular, to undermine important elements of
Quebec's language and cultural policies. Their study suggested that
several trends in the Court's Charterjurisprudence may sharpen the antidemocratic critique of judicial review and of the Court's approach to
Charterreview.
III. THE CHARTER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1993-1997:
REBALANCING LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
IN CANADA
The judicialization of politics sharply declined during the 19931997 period. This is the most important finding of this article's analysis
47 See, for example, A.C. Cairns, CharterVersus Federalism: The Dilemmas of Constitutional
Reform (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992) at 121-23 [hereinafter Charter Versus
Federalism];K. McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada: The Strugglefor National Unity (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1997) at 162; G. Laforest, Trudeau and the End of a CanadianDream (Montreal:

McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995) c. 6; A. Gagnon & G. Laforest, "The Future of Federalism:
Lessons From Canada and Quebec" (1993) 28 Int'l J. 470 at 477-78, 486-87; and P.H. Russell, "The
Political Purposes of the Charter: Have They Been Fulfilled?" in P. Bryden, S. Davis & J. Russell,
eds., ProtectingRights and Freedoms: Essays on the Charter'sPlace in Canada'sPolitical,Legal, and

hItellectualLife (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 33 at 35-36.
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of the 157 Charterdecisions delivered by the Supreme Court between
1993 and 1997. Indeed, the trends identified by Morton, Russell, and
Riddell, which suggested the Court was beginning to move away from
activism towards a more restrained approach to the Charter,became
much stronger during the next 157 Charterdecisions. The Court's overall
support rate for Charter claimants remained relatively stable at 34 per
cent. However, within this overall trend, a series of developments have
emerged, suggesting that the Court has reconciled its relationship with
legislative actors, and the Charter'srelationship to federalism. In federal
systems, judicial review tends to favour the national government because
a Supreme Court is more likely to uphold federal laws and to strike
down provincial laws. 48 In an interesting development, the Court has not
favoured the federal government in recent Charter challenges. In the
1993-1997 period, the federal government replaced Quebec as the
Charter "loser" because the Court used the Charter to invalidate
important elements of federal policy.49 In contrast, the Court became
more supportive of provincial policy, nullifying fewer provincial policies
in this period.
Offering predictions about the Court's future use of the Charter
is a dangerous game.S0 However, the emerging Charterjurisprudence
suggests that the Court has begun a period of decisionmaking that
minimizes conflict with the legislative branch of government. There have
been a number of important structural changes to the Court's approach
to the Charter that strengthen the legitimacy of judicial review on Charter
grounds. For instance, the Court has approached the discretionary
powers of the Charterin a more restrained fashion, most evident in its
growing reluctance to exclude evidence under section 24(2).
Furthermore, the Court turned its attention to the conduct of public
officials during the 1993-1997 period. A damaging criticism levelled
against the Supreme Court was its tendency to hear Charter cases in
panels of seven or fewer judges, a practice the 1994 study found the

48 See A. Bzdera, "Comparative Analysis of Federal High Courts: A Political Theory of
Judicial Review" (1993) 26 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 3 at 3-5, 11-13, 27; and E. McWhinney, "Judicial Review

in a Federal and Plural Society: The Supreme Court of Canada" in J.R. Schmidhauser, ed.,
ComparativeJudicialSystems: Challenging Frontiersin Conceptual and EmpiricalAnalysis (London:

Butterworths, 1987) 63 at 67-68.
49 See "Judicial Politics Canadian-Style," supra note 31 at 139-40. Morton concluded that
Quebec was the Charter loser because of the Charter'seffect on Quebec's language and education
policy.

50 See K. Swinton, "The Charter and the New Pluralism," in G.-A. Beaudoin, ed., The Charter:
Ten Years Later (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 1992) 193 at 196.
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Court adopted in 80 per cent of Charter cases. 51 The problem identified
by Andrew Heard was that the judges varied in their approach to the
Charter, and by sitting in incomplete panels, the outcome was highly
discretionary and dependent upon which judges sat on a panel.5 2 This
approach to the Charter undermined the legitimacy of judicial review,
and called into question the value of entrenched rights if the outcome
could be determined by simply substituting judges on Charterpanels.
The practice of sitting in panels of seven or fewer judges was
severely curbed in the 157 Charter cases decided between 1993 and 1997.
Perhaps more importantly, the Supreme Court has returned to a more
unanimous approach to its Charter decisionmaking. The 1994 study
suggested that the increasing number of dissenting opinions represented
an end to the Court's initial activist "honeymoon" with the Charter.53
The statistical analysis of the Charter cases decided between 1993 and
1997 suggests that the Court has begun a "second honeymoon," with one
important exception. The return to a higher rate of unanimity has not
placed the Court in a competitive relationship with the legislative branch
of government, as it did during the initial period of Charter activism
between 1984 and 1985. Instead, the Court's return to a higher degree of
unanimous Charter decisions suggests that the Court has resolved its
conflict with the nature of its role, which Monahan reported as a tension
between law and politics in its early decisionmaking.5 4 The higher rate of
unanimity combined with a moderately activist approach to the Charter
suggests that the Court has defined a role under the Charterthat it is
comfortable with, a role that balances two competing pressures: first,
ensuring that the Charter is an effective instrument that protects rights
and freedoms,55 and second, ensuring that judicial review under the
between the
Charter does not create a confrontational relationship
56
judicial and legislative branches of government.
51 See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 52.
52 See A.D. Heard, "The Charter in the Supreme Court of Canada: The Importance of Which
Judges Hear an Appeal" (1991) 24 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 289 [hereinafter "The Charter in the Supreme

Court"].
53 See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supranote 4 at 32.
54 See Politicsandthe Constitution,supra note 11.
55 See W.S. Tarnopolsky, "The Charter and the Supreme Court," in Beaudoin, ed., supra note
50,63.

56 See Lamer, C.J.C., "Opening Remarks" in Beaudoin, ed., supra note 50, 9 at 11-12; Dickson
C.J.C., "The CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms: Dawn of a New Era?" (1994) 2 Rev. Const.

Stud. 1 at 19; La Forest J., "The Balancing of Interests Under the Charter" (1993) 2 N.J.C.L. 133 at
146-47; McLachlin J., "The Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Judicial Perspective" (1988-1989)
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Russell notes that before the Charter'sintroduction, the Court
maintained a balance in federalism cases between the two levels of
government: "In so many areas the net outcome of its decision making is
to strike a balance between federal and provincial powers." 57 Russell
attributed this balance to the Court's awareness that it had a credibility
problem with the provinces because the Court was appointed by the
federal government.5 8 Shannon Smithey argued that this balance has
extended to the Charter, where the Court is "generally supportive of
government authority, upholding the actions of both orders of
government in a majority of cases." 59 Maintaining the Court's credibility,
however, is now a more complex task than balancing federal and
provincial powers. The Court must articulate a method of judicial review
that ensures an effective Charterwithout creating a hostile relationship
between the legislative and judicial branches of government. Can this
explain the Court's consistent support rate for Charter claimants at 34
per cent (118/352)? At a minimum, the consistent level of support for
Charterclaimants may not silence Chartercritics, but it does appear to
address the new dilemma for the Court: a credibility problem that arises
when the Court is too activist in interpreting the Charter,but equally so
when the Court undermines entrenched rights and freedoms by being
too deferential to governments.
There have been important changes in the Court's approach to
the Charterbetween 1993 and 1997 that have marginalized the negative
implications of judicial activism and the potential for centralization of
Canadian federalism attributed to Charter review. The Court has
become less interested in challenging the decisions of democratic actors
and has demonstrated a growing appreciation of the policy choices of
provincial governments. This is true even though the overall level of
support for Charterclaimants has remained relatively stable at 34 per
cent.
A notable feature of the Court between 1993 and 1997 was the
relative stability in the Court's membership. Justices Stevenson and La
Forest retired and were replaced by Major and Bastarache JJ. This
stands in contrast to the 1985-1992 period, during which seven judges on
the Court were replaced. The relative stability in the Court's
23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 579 at 587-88; and Strayer J., "Life Under the Canadian Charter: Adjusting the
Balance Between Legislatures and Courts" [19881 Pub. L 356 at 365-66.
57 P.H. Russell, "The Supreme Court and Federal-Provincial Relations: The Political Use of
Legal Resources" (1985) 11 Can. Pub. Pol. 161 at 162-63.
58

Ibid. at 163.

59 Smithey, supra note 1 at 87.
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membership between 1993 and 1997 may be important in understanding
the return to unanimity in Charter decisionmaking and the emerging
judicial consensus on the Charter.
A. The Charter'sImpact on the Supreme Court
The Charter's impact on the Supreme Court's caseload for the
1993-1997 period was consistent with the findings of the 1994 study, with
one important exception: the Charterstill constitutes roughly 25 per cent
of the Court's work load, but the proportion of Chartercases decided by
the Supreme Court has increased as a proportion of the Court's caseload
in recent years. The 1994 study found that Charter cases represented 18
per cent of the Court's case load, 60 and this increased to 27 per cent
between 1993 and 1997.
TABLE 1

CHARTER DECISIONS AS PER CENT OF TOTAL
SUPREME COURT CASELOAD, 1993-1997

Year
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1982-1997
1982-1992
1993-1997

Total Decisions

CharterDecisions

Per Cent of Total

140
110
110
117
102

43
25
26
40
23

31
23
24
34
23

1689
1110
579

352
195
157

21
18
27

Morton, Russell, and Riddell rejected the suggestion that the
Charter was transforming the Supreme Court into a "Constitutional
Court" similar to the European model. 61 However, Monahan noted that
since 1974, the number of private law cases decided by the Supreme
Court continued to decline, and the number of public law cases
increased. 62 Russell found that this trend continued to 1990, with public
law cases increasingly representing a larger proportion of cases decided
60 See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supranote 4 at 3, Table 1.
61 Ibid at 4.
62 See Politicsand the Constitution, supra note 11 at 18.
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by the Supreme Court. 63 Indeed, Chartercases represented 31 per cent
of all Court decisions in 1993, and 34 per cent in 1996. This trend
suggests that the Supreme Court is increasingly becoming a public law
court under the Charter.64
B. Outcomes of Supreme Court CharterDecisions
One of the more interesting developments in the Court's use of
the Charter is the consistency in the success rate for Charterclaimants in
a period when the Court underwent many changes in its approach to the
Charter.The Court's support for Charterclaimants remained stable at 34
per cent, just slightly above the level of support reported by the 1994
study. There are a number of important developments, however, within
Chartersuccess rates between 1993 and 1997 that need to be highlighted.
In particular, the success rates were some of the lowest reported since
the Court began hearing Chartercases in 1984. For instance, the lowest
rate of success for Charterclaimants occurred in 1993 (23 per cent), and
the fourth lowest was in 1996 (28 per cent). Yet, within this same subset
of decisions, the Charter claimant recorded some of the highest success
rates since the initial activist period (1984 to 1985). The years 1997 and
1994 would rank third and fourth, respectively, in overall success rates
for rights claimants for the first 352 Charter decisions.
The net effect of the stabilization of the Charter'ssuccess rate at
34 per cent is a consolidation of the Court's "grey middle." The Morton,
Russell, and Riddell study concluded that the movement from a
Trudeau to a Mulroney Court did not substitute an activist voting bloc
for a conservative bloc, as Beatty suggested. Rather, it resulted in the
emergence of a "centre-dominant Court in Canada." 65 Chief Justice
Lamer was the last Trudeau appointment on the Court, and he too
moved firmly towards the centre-dominant bloc. Indeed, all judges
except Gonthier J. (26 per cent) fall within a relatively narrow radius of
the Court average of 34 per cent: McLachlin J. (39 per cent); Lamer
C.J., Sopinka, and Cory JJ. (37 per cent); Major J. (36 per cent);
Iacobucci J. (35 per cent); La Forest J. (33 per cent); and L'Heureux63 See "Commentary on S.C.R. Statistics," supra note 6 at 772.
64 See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 5, where they concluded that the Charter

"has contributed to the Court's transformation into a decidedly 'public law' court." This conclusion
is much stronger in the 1993-1997 period, as Chartercases represented a higher percentage of the
Court's cases.

65 Ibid. at 39.
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Dub6 J. (32 per cent). 6 6 This narrow radius is important because it
represents a growing consensus among the judges regarding the Court's
use of the Charterand the appropriate scope of judicial review under the
Charter. More importantly, the declining success rates and the
convergence of judicial opinion around the Court average between 1993
and 1997 suggest an important development in Charter politics: the
Court's growing attempt to accord democratic actors enough deference
to ensure that the Charterdoes not overwhelm either federalism or the
effective functioning of parliamentary democracy.
TABLE 2

OUTCOME OF SUPREME COURT CHARTER DECISIONS, 1993-1997
Year

Losses

Wins (%)

Inconclusive

Total

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

33
14
18
26
10

10 (23)
11 (44)
8 (31)
11 (28)
13 (57)

0
0
0
3
0

43
25
26
40
23

217
116
101

118 (34)
65(33)
53 (34)

17
14
3

352
195
157

1984-1997
1984-1992
1993-1997

C. Treatmentof Courts ofAppeal
The Supreme Court of Canada is growing increasingly more
reluctant to support the decisions of appeal courts. During the first one
hundred Charter decisions, the Supreme Court supported the appeal
courts 68 per cent of the time, 67 and this level of support declined to 64
per cent over the first 195 Charter decisions.68 The downward trend
continues, with appeal court decisions affirmed 61 per cent of the time
by the Supreme Court over the first 352 Charterdecisions. 6 9 The Court
continues to support the decisions of appeal courts, but this support
could be considered lukewarm at best. In 1994, Morton, Russell, and

66 See Table 18, below.
67 See Morton, Russell & Withey, supra note 5 at 17.
68 See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 9, Table 3.
69 See Table 3, below.
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Riddell suggested that the higher reversal rate could be attributed to the
Supreme Court becoming more strategic in its use of appeals, selecting
cases "which it initially intuits a 'mistake' that deserves a hard second
look."70 The support rates for appeal courts suggest this strategic use of
appeals continues, and with greater intensity-eight appeal courts have
support rates at 50 per cent or below. The Quebec Court of Appeal has
been replaced by the Prince Edward Island Court of Appeal as the
appeal court with the highest reversal rate among the provinces.
However, Quebec continues to have one of the highest reversal rates,
with at least ten decisions reviewed by the Supreme Court of Canada.
Quebec's higher reversal rate is likely the result of the differing legal
norms that structure the provinces' courts, which the 1994 study
suggested may be the result of the "clash between the civil law norms
and common law norms that predominate on the two different courts."71
Ontario has replaced British Columbia as the province with the appeal
court most likely to have its decisions upheld by the Court, confirming
Smithey's earlier finding that Ontario is favoured by the Court. 72
The Quebec Court of Appeal experienced the highest overall
increase in cases affirmed by the Supreme Court, at 4 per cent (45 to 49
per cent). The Federal Court also experienced an increase of 4 per cent,
while Ontario remained unchanged at 71 per cent. Since 1992, however,
most appeal courts experienced a significant decline in support rates.
The Supreme Court had not reversed an appeal court decision from
Newfoundland or Prince Edward Island before 1992. After 1993,
however, the Court upheld only 3 of 6 (50 per cent) Newfoundland
appeal court decisions, and 2 of 5 (40 per cent) Prince Edward Island
appeal court rulings. Despite this significant change for the two appeal
courts, it is reasonably explained by the small number of cases appealed
from these two provinces. If we exclude provinces that have had less
than 15 Charter cases appealed to the Supreme Court, the trend
continues in a less dramatic downward fashion. For instance, the British
Columbia Court of Appeal had a support rate of 68 per cent for the first
352 Charterdecisions (41/60), down 6 per cent from the first 195 Charter
decisions. Similarly, the Supreme Court's support of the Manitoba Court
of Appeal declined from 58 per cent (7/12) to 47 per cent (8/17) during
the same period, and a modest decrease was also experienced by the
Alberta Court of Appeal (3 per cent).

70 Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 10.

71 Ibid.
72 See Smithey, supra note 1 at 99.
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TABLE 3
THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF COURTS OF APPEAL'S
CHARTER DECISIONS, 1984-1997

Upheld

Reversed

Total

% Upheld
1984-1997

% Upheld
1984-1992

N.W.T.
1
Ontario
79
B.C.
41
Federal Court
17
Alberta
17
Nfld.
3
New Brunswick 5
Sask.
6
Yukon
1
Nova Scotia
9
Quebec
19
Manitoba
8
P.E.I.
2

0
30
19
8
14
2
5
6
1
9
18
9
1

1
111(b)
60
25
33(b)
6(a)
10
12
2
18
39(b)
17
5(b)

100
71
68
68
52
50
50
50
50
50
49
47
40

100
71
74
64
55
100
67
57
50
50
45
58
100

1984-1997
1984-1992

122
64

339(c)
188

61
n/a

n/a
64

208
121

(a) Includes one case upheld in part, reversed in part.
(b) Includes two cases upheld in part, reversed in part.

(c)Total is 339 instead of 352 because three decisions came as a reference directly from the federal
government, with no lower court decisions to review; two decisions came from the Court Martial
tribunals; one decision came directly from the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench; two decisions from
the Quebec Superior Court; two decisions from the Nova Scotia Supreme Court; one decision from
the Ontario Court; and two decisions from the Prince Edward Island Supreme Court.

While the Supreme Court's support for appeal court decisions
declined 3 per cent since the first 195 Charter decisions, many appeal
courts experienced important downward trends between 1993 and
1997.73 For instance, only the Quebec Court of Appeal had a support
rate lower than 50 per cent during the first 195 Charter decisions. This
changed dramatically during the 1993-1997 period. The Supreme Court
reviewed 157 decisions from 11 appeal courts during this period, and 7
appeal courts had support rates below 50 per cent. A modest increase of
4 per cent moved Quebec from having the lowest level of decisions
upheld by the Supreme Court to the fourth highest. Incidentally, there is
a trend in the 1993-1997 period that is not a positive development for
centre-periphery relations in Canada. With the exception of Alberta, the
73

See Table 3A, below.
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appeal courts in "have" provinces all experienced support rates of 50 per
cent or greater, whereas the "have not" provinces were more likely to
have their appeal court decisions reversed by the Supreme Court.7 4 This
trend is even more surprising given the decline of intergovernmental
conflict in Canada since the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord in 1992.
The decline of intergovernmental conflict in the 1993-1997 period can be
explained by the Court's tendency to focus on challenges to the conduct
of public officials, and not challenges to statutes and regulations. The
Supreme Court is reversing more lower court decisions, yet it is avoiding
directly challenging the policy choices of Parliament or the provincial
legislatures. The higher reversal rate has not created the climate for
intergovernmental conflict or criticism of the Court by democratic actors
as it has not resulted in the nullification of government policy. This issue
is addressed in Tables 6 and 7, below.
TABLE 3A
THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF COURTS OF APPEAL'S
CHARTER DECISIONS, 1993-1997
Upheld

Reversed

Federal Court
Ontario
B.C.
Quebec
Nova Scotia
Alberta

8
34
18
8
5
6

3
13
11
6
5
6

11
48(a)
29
15(a)
10
13(a)

73
71
62
53
50
46

New Brunswick
Nfld.
Sask.

3
2
2

4
2
3

7

43

5(a)

40

5

40

Manitoba
P.E.I.

1
0

4
1

5

20

3(b)

0

87

58

151(c)

58

Total

Total

% Upheld

(a) Includes one decision reversed in part, upheld in part.
(b) Includes two decisions reversed in part, upheld in part.
(c) Total is 151 instead of 157 because two decisions came from the Nova Scotia Supreme Court;
two decisions from the Prince Edward Island Supreme Court; one case from the Quebec Superior
Court; and one case from the Ontario Court.

74 "Have not" provinces may be distinguished from "have" provinces in that "have not"
provinces rely heavily on federal transfer payments as an important component of provincial
budgets.
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TABLE 4
OUTCOME OF DECISIONS THAT REVERSED APPEAL COURT
1984-1997
CharterClaimant
Win Loss Both Total

1993-1997
CharterClaimant
Win Loss Both Total

P.E.I.
Nfld.
N.W.T.
B.C.
Ontario
New Brunswick
Federal Court
Manitoba
Sask.
Alberta
Nova Scotia
Yukon
Quebec

0
1
0
15
20
4
3
4
3
11
6
1
9

1
1
0
4
6
1
5
3
3
3
3
0
8

0
0
0
0
4
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
1

1
2
0
19
30
5
8
9
6
14
9
1
18

0
1
0
9
11
3
1
2
2
4
4
0
5

1
1
0
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
1
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
2
0
11
13
4
3
4
3
6
5
0
6

Total
Per Cent

77
63

38
31

7
6

122

42
72

16
28

0
0

58

There has been a significant rise in the reversals of appeal
decisions to favour the Charterclaimant. In the 64 decisions reversed by
the Supreme Court between 1984 and 1992, the claimant was successful
55 per cent of the time. 75 In comparison, the 122 decisions reversed by
the Court between 1984 and 1997 saw the success rate rise to 63 per cent
for Charter claimants. The Supreme Court reversed 58 appeal court
decisions between 1993 and 1997, and the Charter claimant was
successful in 72 per cent of the cases. Accounting for the Supreme
Court's willingness to support the individual in appeal decisions that it
reversed, the 1994 study suggested two possible explanations: "This may
reflect the Supreme Court's greater willingness to break new ground in
Charter jurisprudence-to broaden rights and to narrow permissible
limitations. On the other hand, it may simply result from the much larger
pool of appeals by Charterlosers in the lower appeal courts." 76 However,
given that the Court's overall support rate for Charter claimants has
75

See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 11, Table 4.

76

Iba.at 11.
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remained steady, and its use of the Charter's discretionary powers has
become more restrained, it is difficult to conclude that the Supreme
Court is broadening rights and narrowing limitations. What this trend
does suggest, however, is that the Supreme Court is increasingly
selecting appeals where it considers that a mistake has been made, and it
is selecting these cases from a larger number of Charter losers in appeal
courts. Perhaps more importantly, these appeals are drawn
overwhelmingly from legal rights cases involving the conduct of public
officials.
D. DifferentRights and Freedoms
There is a tremendous amount of variation in success rates for
different Charter rights. What is more important, however, is that
different Charter rights impact federalism and liberal constitutionalism
to varying degrees. In the case of federalism, the Charter is largely
viewed as a document that limits pluralism and, thus, federal diversity in
Canada.77 But not all Charter sections have implications for federalism
and, more to the point, the sections that pose the greatest threat to
federal diversity have not been the focus of the Supreme Court's Charter
jurisprudence. This is a point that has not been properly addressed by
commentators that decry the Charter'snation-building imperatives. In
many respects, Charter critics such as Guy Laforest equate the nationbuilding potential of the Charterwith the reality of the Charter'seffect on
Canadian federalism.78 In simple terms, the Charter has not had the
enduring effect on federalism that is claimed by Chartercritics. Indeed,
in those areas where the Charter was expected to limit provincial

77 See A. Baccigalupo, "Le syst~me politique canadien depuis l'av~nement de la Charte:

d6mocratie ou juriscratie?" in L. Balthazar, G. Laforest & V. Lemieux, eds., Le Quebec et la
Restructurationdu Canada,1980-1992: enjeux et perspectives (Sillery, Qc.: Septentrion, 1991) 121 at

123-24; A. Bzdera, "Perspectives qu6b~coises sur laCour supreme du Canada" (1992) 7:2 Can. J. L.
& Soc'y 1 at 13-16; A.C. Cairns, "The Case for Charter-Federalism" in D.E. Williams, ed.,
Reconfigurations:CanadianCitizenship and ConstitutionalChange (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart,
1995) 186 at 189; A.C. Cairns, "The Charter: A Political Science Perspective" (1992) 30 Osgoode

Hall L.J. 615 at 616; P.W. Hogg, "Federalism Fights the Charter" in Shugarman & Whitaker, eds.,
supra note 18, 249 at 249-50; and G. Laforest, "La Charte canadienne des droits et libert6s au
Quebec: nationaliste, injuste et ill6gitime" in F. Rocher, Bilan qtibeois du fidiralismne canadien
(Montreal: VLB, 1992) 124 at 126-27,128-31 [hereinafter "La Charte canadienne"].
78 See "La Charte canadienne," supra note 77 at 129-30; G. Laforest, "Quebec Beyond the

Federal Regime of 1867-1982: From Distinct Society to National Community" in R.L. Watts &
D.M. Brown, eds., Options for a New Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991) 103 at
113-14.
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autonomy, such as language and education policy, the Court initially
proved the critics to be correct. This has not been a sustaining feature of
the Court's jurisprudence: since the initial period of activism, the Court
has addressed very few language and education policy cases. The
Supreme Court demonstrated a renewed sensitivity to federalism in the
1993-1997 period and a greater appreciation of policy variation among
the provinces. This is a significant development, as the provinces grew
increasingly critical of the Court's interpretation of the Charterin the
first decade.
There are a number of trends in Table 5, below, that are
consistent with trends identified in the 1994 study by Morton, Russell,
and Riddell. For instance, legal rights continue to dominate the
Supreme Court's Chartercaseload and account for nearly two-thirds of
rights cases decided by the Court. This trend has implications for both
the legitimacy of Charter review and the effect of the Charter on
Canadian federalism. Specifically, legal rights represent a policy area
where, arguably, the Court can be most effective as a policy actor. Thus,
the legitimacy crisis of Charter review, which is at the core of arguments
advanced by right-wing critics, appears overstated. Perhaps what is more
interesting is the Court's use of legal rights to advance diversity in the
implementation of the Criminal Code. In a series of cases involving
challenges to the Criminal Code on the basis that the different
application of the Code by the provinces violated Charter rights, the
Supreme Court ruled that variation between the provinces was a natural
development in a federal system and, thus, did not violate entrenched
rights and freedoms.7 9 In sum, the Court has selected a docket that
arguably enhances the legitimacy of judicial review on Chartergrounds
by minimizing the Charter'simplications for federalism and focusing on
policy areas where the Court has the institutional capacity to be
effective.
Fundamental freedoms account for the second largest number of
cases addressed by the Court's Charterjurisprudence. At 52 decisions, or
13 per cent of the Charter cases decided by the Supreme Court, they
remain a distant second to legal rights. The Court's support rate for
fundamental freedoms has continued to decline, confirming the 1994
study's conclusion that the Court has not been "activist in cases dealing

79 See R. v. Sheldon, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 254 at 276; and R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 at 133233. In R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, the Supreme Court ruled that geographical variation in the
administration of justice did not constitute an arbitrary application of the CiminalCode. Justice La

Forest concluded, at 349, that "variation among provinces in this regard may be inevitable and,
indeed, desirable in a country where the federal statute is administered by local authorities."
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with the traditional political freedoms of a liberal society." 80 The support
rate for fundamental freedoms was 27 per cent for the first 352 Charter
decisions (14/52), and significantly lower than the overall support rate of
34 per cent. This represents a 2 per cent decrease from the 1994 study,
where it was found that the Court supported fundamental freedoms in
29 per cent of the cases decided.81 In fact, the support levels for all
Charterrights decreased from the 1994 findings, with the exception of
equality rights and democratic rights. In the case of democratic rights,
the first successful use of this Chartersection occurred in 1993 in Sauvd
v. Canada (A.G.).82 In Sauvd, the Court ruled that section 51(e) of the
Canada Elections Act,83 which denied prisoners the right to vote, was
drawn too broadly and could not be saved under section 1 of the
Charter.8 4
TABLE 5
DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF RIGHTS CASES BY RESULT, 1984-1997
Rights

Wins (%)

Losses

14 (27)
1 (20)
1 (17)
85 (32)
7 (20)
7 (41)
6 (46)

35
4
5
168
24
8
6

3
0
0
13
4
2
1

52
5
6
266
35
17
13

0
0

1
1

0
0

1
1

121 (31)

252

23

396(d)

Fundamental Freedoms
Democratic Rights
Mobility Rights
Legal Rights(a)
Equality Rights
Language/Education Rights(b)
Aboriginal Rights(c)
Multicultural Rights
Gender Equality Rights
Total

Unclear

Total

(a) Includes section 24(2) of the Charter.

(b) Includes sections 16-23 of the Charter,section 93 and 133 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867; section
23 of the ManitobaAct, S.C. 1870, c. 3; and section 16 of the SaskatchewanAct, S.C. 1905, c. 42.
(c) Based on section 35 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982.
(d) The total is higher than 352 because several cases contain multiple Charterissues and are
counted in more than one category.

80 Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 14.
81 Ibid at 12, Table 5.
82 [1993] 2 S.C.R. 438 [hereinafter Sauve].
83 R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2.

84 See Sauv6, supra note 82 at 439-40.
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The Chartersections identified with Trudeau's nation-building
project deserve special attention, simply because they are uniquely
Canadian and they impact federalism to a higher degree than other
sections of the Charter. Mobility rights have not generated a large
number of cases before the Supreme Court, and have produced mixed
results in satisfying Trudeau's nation-building objective. To date, the
Court has heard six cases involving mobility rights, and there has been
only one victory-in Black v. Law Society ofAlberta,8 5 an important case
that removed Alberta's restrictions preventing nonresident lawyers from
practicing in the province. Of the remaining five mobility rights cases,
the Court has dealt with three involving the extradition of criminals to
the United States,8 6 and one involving the rights of non-Canadians.S 7
Morton, Russell, and Riddell noted that these cases are "peripheral to
the nation-building objectives of the primary author of section 6, Pierre
Trudeau."88 In the remaining case, Walker v. Prince EdwardIsland,89 the
Court was asked to consider whether P.E.I.'s restrictions on nonresident
accountants were a violation of mobility rights. In a departure from
Black, the Court ruled that restrictions on nonresidents were not a
violation of the Charter, and allowed an interprovincial barrier to escape
a successful Charterchallenge. 90 Language and education rights continue
to attract the second highest support rate at 41 per cent, but the support
for these Charterclaims has steadily declined. This trend suggests that
the loss of autonomy for the provinces in education policy was not an
enduring feature of the Charter's effect on Canadian federalism, but a
characteristic of the Court's initial judicial activism. This trend will
become more apparent when the 157 Charter cases decided by the
Supreme Court between 1993 and 1997 are discussed.
Aboriginal rights represent the largest growth area in rightsbased litigation heard before the Supreme Court. Indeed, only one
Aboriginal rights case was heard during the first 195 cases, but this
increased to 13 cases for the first 352 Charter decisions. As well,
Aboriginal rights have the highest success rates before the Supreme
Court, at 46 per cent. Many of the victories in cases like R. v.
85 [198911 S.C.R. 591 [hereinafter Black].
86 See United States of America v. Controni, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469; United States of America v.
Whitley, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 467; and United States of America v. Ross, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 469.
87 See Law Society of Upper Canadav. Skapinker, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357.
88 Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 14.
89 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 407.
90

Jbid. at 409.
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Gladstone,91R. v. Badger,92 R. v. Nikal,93 and R. v. C6td94 have resulted in
stronger protections for Aboriginal fishing and hunting rights. Perhaps
what is more important is that the Court continues to demonstrate
higher support levels for cases that protect linguistic and ethnic
minorities against provincial majorities.
TABLE 5A
DIFFERENT CATEGORY OF RIGHTS CASES BY RESULT, 1993-1997
Rights

Wins (%)

Losses

Unclear

Total

Fundamental Freedoms
Democratic Rights
Mobility Rights
Legal Rights(a)
Equality Rights
Language/Education Rights(b)
Aboriginal Rights(c)
Multicultural Rights
Gender Equality Rights

4(24)
1 (33)
0
38 (31)
4(21)
1 (25)
5 (42)
0
0

12
2
3
83
14
3
6
1
1

1
0
0
2
1
0
1
0
0

17
3
3
123
19
4
12
1
1

Total

53(29)

125

5

183(d)

(a) Includes section 24(2) of the Charter.

(b) Includes sections 16-23 of the Charter,sections 93 and 133 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867; section
23 of the ManitobaAct, S.C. 1870, c. 3; and section 16 of the SaskatchewanAct, S.C. 1905, c. 42.
(c) Based on section 35 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982.
(d)The total is higher than 157 because several cases contain multiple Charter issues and are
counted in more than one category.

A series of developments in the 1993-1997 period limited the
tension been the Charterand the politics of federalism in Canada. The
Supreme Court's handling of language and education rights cases during
the first one hundred Charter decisions was said to have contributed to
the demise of the Meech Lake Accord and the alienation of Quebec
within Canadian federalism. In particular, the Court's nullification of
important sections of the Charter of the French Language9 S in Ford v.

91 [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723.
92 [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771.
93 [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013.
94 [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139.
95 R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-11.
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Quebec (A.G.),96 and Quebec's use of the notwithstanding clause shortly
afterwards, undermined support for the Meech Lake Accord. 9 7 In
Quebec, the Supreme Court's use of the Charterto limit the policy
autonomy of the province in Quebec (A.G.) v. Quebec Assn. of Protestant
School Boards98 increased Quebec's sense of isolation in Canada.
However, an examination of trends in support levels for language and
education rights show a significant transformation between 1984 and
1997 that reduces an important source of conflict between Quebec and
the Charter,and should reduce Quebec's sense of isolation in Canadian
federalism.
The success rate for language and education rights cases has
been significantly higher than the overall Chartersuccess rate of 34 per
cent. A total of 17 language and education rights cases have been
decided by the Supreme Court between 1984 and 1997: 7 in the first one
hundred Chartercases, 6 in cases 101 to 195, and 4 in cases 196 to 352.
There has been a consistent downward trend in support levels for
language and education rights cases over these three periods. For
instance, during the first one hundred Charter cases, the Court
supported the language and education rights claimant 57 per cent of the
time (4/7), 33 per cent during the next 95 Chartercases (2/6), and 25 per
cent during the last 157 Charter cases (1/4). Given this trend, it can be
concluded that the Charter'sentanglement with the politics of language
in Canada has significantly declined as its activism has declined. This is a
trend that usually escapes notice, as the Charter'seffect on language and
education policy is held up as an example of the centralizing impact of
the Charter on federalism. Indeed, many of the examples used to
illustrate the Court's insensitivity to federalism and the place of Quebec
in Confederation continue to be drawn from the activism of the first one
hundred Charter decisions by the Supreme Court. This is unfortunate,
because the activism of the Court in that period does not accurately
characterize the overall effect of the Charteron Canadian federalism. In
a recent study, Yves de Montigny surveyed the Charter's impact on
Quebec and concluded that "[t]he Charter of Rights and Freedoms has
not had the devastating impact on the legislative autonomy of Quebec

96 [198812 S.C.R. 712 [hereinafter Ford].
97

See "Judicial Politics Canadian-Style," supra note 31 at 143.

98 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66 [hereinafter Quebec ProtestantSchool Boards].
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(and of the other provinces) that some may have feared." 99 Nowhere is
this more evident than in the Court's treatment of Charterchallenges to
Quebec statutes since Ford.
The early Charter jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
undermined the credibility of the Charter in Quebec. Russell suggested
that the Court's balanced treatment of division of powers cases was the
result of the Court's awareness that its credibility as a neutral umpire of
Canadian federalism was questioned by the provinces. There have been
distinct phases when the Court has been the centre of controversy in
Canada, and this has typically resulted when the judicialization of
politics has intensified. In each instance, the Court responded by
restructuring its caseload to strengthen the legitimacy of judicial review
in Canada. The same response characterizes the Court's treatment of
language and education rights cases. A notable feature of the Court's
Charterjurisprudence since the constitutional crisis of 1990-1992 is the
sharp reduction in cases decided by the Supreme Court that involve
language and education rights. Between 1984 and 1992, language and
education rights accounted for 6 per cent of the Chartercases decided by
the Court (13/213).100 In the period immediately following the
constitutional crisis of 1992, this figure declined drastically to 2 per cent
of Supreme Court Chartercases (4/183).
An examination of the four language and education rights cases
decided by the Supreme Court between 1993 and 1997 illustrates the
Court's growing reluctance to become involved in the politics of
language. Three of the four cases involved denominational school rights
under the Constitution Act, 1867.101 In Reference Re Education Act
(Que.),l02 Ontario Home Builders' Association v. York Region Board of
0 4 the rights claimant was
Education,10 3 and Adler v. Ontario,7
unsuccessful in demonstrating that section 93 of the ConstitutionAct,
1867 had been infringed. The Court also rejected the contention that
freedom of religion and equality protections were violated in Adler and
99 Y. de Montigny, "The Impact (Real or Apprehended) of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms on the Legislative Authority of Quebec" in D. Schneiderman & K. Sutherland, eds.,
Chartingthe Consequences: The Impact of CharterRights on CanadianLaw and Politics (Toronto:

University of Toronto Press, 1997) 3 at 21; and A.D. Heard, "Quebec Courts and the Canadian
Charter of Rights" (1993) 7-8 Int'l. J. Can. Stud. 153 at 163-64.
100 See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supranote 4 at 12, Table 5.
101 Supra note 7.

102 [1993] 2 S.C.R. 511.
103 [1996] 2 S.C.R. 929 [hereinafter York].

104 [199613 S.C.R. 609 [hereinafter Adler].
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York. More importantly, two of the four cases came as references from
Manitoba and Quebec with no lower court decision for the Supreme
Court to review. Thus, the Court granted leave to hear two language and
education rights cases between 1993 and 1997, or 1 per cent of the cases
heard. In the fourth case, Reference Re Public Schools Act (Man.), s.
79(3), (4) and (7),1o5 the Court ruled that The Public Schools ActlO6 did
not "provide for the implementation of the rights of the linguistic
minority in respect of their educational facilities, including appropriate
mechanisms for management and control."1 0 7 This decision confirmed
the Court's ruling in Mah v. AlbertalO8 that expanded the educational
rights of Francophone minorities outside of Quebec.
In sum, there are important trends in the overall statistics that
suggest that the Court's moderate activism reflected a renewed
sensitivity to federalism, and ensured that Charterreview did not create a
hostile relationship between the legislative and judicial branches of
government.10 9 However, when the Charter is viewed as a layered
document with rights and freedoms that have different effects on
federalism, the reality of the Charter'srelationship to federalism can be
exposed. The nation-building sections of the Charter,far from having a
significant impact on provincial autonomy, in fact only account for a
limited part of the document. What is interesting is that the sections of
the Charter that pose the greatest threat to federal diversity constitute a
small number of cases decided by the Supreme Court. Further, the
nation-building sections of the Charter exhibit the sharpest downward
trend in success rates for Charter rights during the first 352 Charter
decisions. Thus, the Charter's effect on federalism has become more
marginal over time. This is not to minimize the impact of Charter cases
that do have implications for federal diversity, but simply to emphasize
that when we speak of the Charter as a centralizing instrument, this
characterization is not true for the entire document, but only for a
narrow range of rights and freedoms representing a minority of Supreme
Court Chartercases.

105 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 839 [hereinafter Reference Re Public SchoolsAct (Man.)].
106 R.S.M. 1987, c. P250.
107 Reference Re Public SchoolsAct (Man.), supra note 105 at 842.
10S [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342 [hereinafter Mahe].
109 See P.W. Hogg & A.A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures
(Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All)" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J.
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E. The Object of CharterChallenges and the Nullification of Statutes
The Charter has the potential to place the judicial and the
legislative branches of government in a confrontational relationship that
may call into question the legitimacy of judicial review. Indeed, critics
have suggested that the Court's use of the Charterduring the first 195
Charterdecisions undermined the legitimacy of judicial review because
the Court was more willing to hear cases that challenged the substantive
policy choices of democratic actors. In the first 195 Charter decisions,
challenges to statutes or regulations accounted for 54 per cent of the
cases decided by the Supreme Court (122/227).110 The importance of
this development for liberal constitutionalism should be readily
apparent. By focusing on statutes and regulations, the Court placed itself
in a confrontational relationship with democratic actors for control of
the policy process in Canada. This shift in focus intensified the
judicialization of politics in our parliamentary democracy.
TABLE 6
OBJECT OF CHARTER CHALLENGES, 1984-1997

Statute
Conduct
Regulation
Total

Wins

Losses

Both

51
74
9

106
127
6

12
7
1

169
208
16

134

239

20

393(a)

Total

(a) Total is higher than 352 because some Charter challenges involve challenges to both statute and
conduct, statute and regulation, etcetera, and have been counted under additional categories as
appropriate.

The trends that emerge during the first 352 Chartercases have
important implications for the relationship between the judicial and
legislative actors in Canada. In a reversal of the data from the 1994
study, the Court focused on cases that challenge the conduct of public
officials: 53 per cent of Charter cases involved such challenges between
1984 and 1997 (208/393). This development is important for several
reasons. First, the Court has improved its relationship with the
legislative branch of government by curbing its tendency to challenge the
substantive policy choices of Parliament and the provincial legislatures.
This shift in focus by the Court reduces the salience of the anti110 See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 18, Table 6.

1999]

655

RebalancingLiberal Constitutionalism

democratic critique of judicial review under the Charterthat grew louder
during the first decade of Charterdecisions. Second, judicial review that
focuses on the conduct of public officials tends to involve issues-like
the procedural rights of individuals-that the Court has the capacity to
address effectively.
TABLE 6A

OBJECT OF CHARTER CHALLENGES, 1993-1997
Wins

Losses

Both

Total

Statute
Conduct
Regulation

14
39
5

42
63
2

0
1
0

56
103
7

Total

58

107

1

166(a)

(a) Total is higher than 157 because some Charterchallenges involve challenges to both statute and

conduct, statute and regulation, etcetera, and have been counted under additional categories as
appropriate.

A trend that clearly demonstrates the rebalancing of liberal
constitutionalism in Canada is the transformation in the object of
Charterchallenges before the Supreme Court since 1992. The significant
change in focus in this period minimizes the sources of conflict between
judicial and legislative actors. Sixty-two per cent of Charter cases
involved the conduct of public officials (103/166). The Court's
confrontations with legislative actors have been reduced to a much
smaller component of Chartercases. The Court now accords legislative
actors a degree of deference in public policy that was not evident in the
first 195 Chatter decisions. In many regards, the Court appears to have
recognized the costs to its credibility when it directly challenges the
substantive policy choices of government, and has retreated to a mode of
judicial review that attempts to limit an overly competitive relationship
with legislative actors.
An important consideration that escaped attention in the 1994
study by Morton, Russell, and Riddell is the success rates of Charter
cases involving challenges to statutes and regulations. Despite the
Court's growing acceptance of challenges to statutes and regulations
between 1984 and 1992, the success rates have demonstrated a
downward trend since 1984. The increasing number of challenges to
statutes and regulations heard by the Court turned out to be not as
problematic as Morton, Russell, and Riddell suggested because of the
declining success rates for Charterclaimants. For the first one hundred
Charterdecisions, the success rate against statutes and regulations was
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38 per cent (20/52),111 a figure substantially higher than the overall
average of 34 per cent. This figure declined to 34 per cent for the first
195 Charterdecisions (41/122),112 and 31 per cent for the first 352
Charterdecisions (58/185). This downward trend is even more significant
if we focus on the 157 Chartercases decided by the Court between 1993
and 1997. The number of Charterchallenges to statutes and regulations
was a small part of the Court's Charterjurisprudence, and the success
rate declined to 30 per cent (19/63).
TABLE 7
NULLIFICATION OF STATUTES AND REGULATIONS, 1984-1997
Nullified

Upheld

Total

Federal
Provincial
Territorial
Municipal

30
26
0
2

80
41
1
0

110
67
1
2

1984-1997
1984-1992
1993-1997

58
41
17

122
78
44

180(a)
119
61

(a) There are four instances where the same federal statute is nullified in different cases, and one
instance where the same Quebec regulation is nullified in different cases. These cases are counted
as one nullification for a total of 180 (not 185): 169 statutes and 16 regulations.

The legitimacy of judicial review under the Charterhas benefited
from the Court's decision to select more cases that involve the conduct
of public officials. However, the legitimacy of judicial review in Canada
extends beyond the judiciary's relationship to democratic actors within
liberal constitutionalism. It is also dependent on the Charter'seffect on
the federal character of Canada. The Supreme Court used the Charterto
nullify 58 statutes during the first 352 Charterdecisions. The 1994 study
found that the Court nullified more federal statutes (23) than provincial
statutes (18) during the first 195 Charterdecisions.II 3 The number of
federal statutes nullified (30) continues to exceed the number of
provincial statutes nullified (26) under the Charter for the first 352
Charterdecisions. Morton, Russell, and Riddell argued that the higher
number of federal statutes nullified misrepresented the Charter'simpact

Ill See Morton, Russell & Withey, supra note 5 at 24, Table 6.
112 See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 18, Table 6.
113 Ibid. at 19, Table 7.
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on federalism because the Charteractually had a larger impact on the
provinces, despite fewer provincial statutes being nullified. The authors
identified important qualitative differences in the types of statutes
nullified, which supported the conclusion that the Charter had a
disproportionate effect on the provinces, and thus reduced the federal
character of Canada:
Seventy-four per cent (17) of the 23 nullifications of federal statutes were ... based on the
legal rights provisions of the Charter and were procedural in character. By contrast, 72

per cent (13) of the 18 nullifications of provincial statutes were substantive in character,
language
and eight of them were based directly or indirectly on French-English minority
114

and education issues-a perennial source of conflict in Canadian politics.

This qualitative difference between federal and provincial statutes
nullified was said to limit the policy autonomy of the provinces and to
advance policy uniformity in Canada.llS This conclusion is more
pronounced in the case of Quebec, where the Court nullified important
sections of the province's language and education policy between 1984
and 1992.
There are important qualitative changes in the 1993-1997 period
that suggest that the Charter'sdisproportionate effect on the provinces
has declined to a large extent, and that the Court is acting in a more
balanced fashion toward both levels of government. In the overall data
set of 352 cases, the trends identified in the 1994 study continued, but
with much less force. In particular, 67 per cent (20) of the 30 federal
statutes nullified in this period (1984-1997) involved legal rights, and
were procedural in nature. This represents a 7 per cent decline from the
first 195 Charter decisions, where 74 per cent (17) of the 23 federal
statutes nullified involved legal rights.116 This decline is even more
dramatic during the 157 Chartercases between 1993 and 1997,117 where
only 57 per cent (4) of the 7 federal statutes nullified involved the
Charter's legal rights. A corresponding decline was evident in federal
statutes nullified that involved aspects of criminal law. In the first 195
Charter decisions, 65 per cent (15) of federal statutes nullified were
concerned with criminal law.118 This declined to 60 per cent for the first
352 Charter decisions.
114 Ibid. at 20.
115 See Charter Versus Federalism,supra note 47 at 76-77; and CharterPolitics,supra note 38 at

378-79.
116 See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 20.
117

See Appendix 3, Table 8, below.

118 See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 20.
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These qualitative differences in federal statutes nullified become
more visible if we focus on the 157 Chartercases decided by the Supreme
Court between 1993 and 1997. For instance, 43 per cent (3) of the 7
federal statutes nullified in this period involved criminal law, and the
number of federal statutes nullified that were substantive in character
increased. During the first 195 Charter decisions, 26 per cent (6) of the
23 federal statutes nullified were substantive in character.119 This value
increased to 30 per cent (9) between 1984 and 1997. In the subset of 157
Chartercases decided between 1993 and 1997, 43 per cent (3) of the 7
federal statutes nullified were substantive. Morton, Russell, and Riddell
suggested that "judicial nullification of criminal law serves a law reform
function but not a centralizing function." 120 Thus, the Charter had a
reforming effect on an important area of federal jurisdiction between
1984 and 1992. While there were some notable federal policies nullified
in this period, such as the sections of the Criminal Code dealing with
abortion services in R. v. Morgentaler,1 21 and the procedures for
determining refugee status in Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration),122 most federal statutes nullified involved procedural
aspects of the CriminalCode.
Turning to the 1993-1997 period, the Supreme Court in Sauv6123
nullified sections of the CanadaElections Act 124 that denied prisoners
the right to vote. Further, the Court nullified sections of the Tobacco
Products Control Act 125 that proscribed advertising restrictions on
tobacco products. In RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.),126 the
Supreme Court refused to accept the federal government's legislation as
a reasonable limitation on freedom of expression. Finally, the Court
nullified the retroactive citizenship criteria of the Citizenship Act.' 27 In
Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State),128 the Supreme Court ruled that
the CitizenshipAct's requirement that persons born abroad to Canadian
119 Ibid. at 21-22, Table 8.
12 0

Ibid. at 20.

121 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
122 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.
123

Supra note 82.

12 4

Supra note 83.

125

S.C. 1988, c. 20.

126 [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199.
127

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29.

128 [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358.
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mothers must undergo a security clearance was a violation of section
15(1) of the Charter,and could not be justified under section 1. In the
overall statistics, the type of federal statute nullified continues to be
concerned with criminal law and to be procedural in character. However,
the 1993-1997 period is a departure from this trend. When federal
statutes nullified in this period are compared to provincial statutes, we
can see that the Charterhad a greater impact on the federal government.
For this reason, Ottawa was the Charter"loser" in the 157 Charter cases
decided by the Supreme Court between 1993 and 1997.
Provincial statutes nullified continue to be overwhelmingly
substantive in character. In the first 195 Supreme Court Charter
decisions, 72 per cent (13) of the 18 provincial statutes nullified were
substantive, 129 and this increased to 77 per cent (20) of the 26 provincial
statutes nullified between 1984 and 1997. For the 1993-1997 period, this
value increased to 88 per cent (7) of the 8 provincial statutes nullified.
At first glance, this trend would suggest that the Charter is having its
greatest impact on provincial jurisdiction, and that the Charter has
reduced the federal character of Canada. However, a closer examination
of the statutes nullified between 1993 and 1997 demonstrates that the
Charterhas had a stronger impact on the federal government.
The increase in substantive nullifications of provincial statutes is
the result of the dramatic rise in Aboriginal rights cases decided by the
Supreme Court between 1993 and 1997. Aboriginal rights are largely
substantive in character, and 38 per cent (3) of the 8 provincial
nullifications in this period involved regulations that affected Aboriginal
fishing and hunting rights. However, the provincial laws at issue in this
period had limited significance for democratic actors and provincial
majorities. The exceptions to this statement would be the Court's rulings
in Reference Re Public Schools Act (Man.)' 30 and Libman v. Quebec
(A.G.).731

The number of provinces to have legislation nullified under the
Charterincreased from 6 to 7 for the first 352 Charterdecisions: B.C.,
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, and P.E.I. While
Quebec remains the province most affected by judicial nullifications, the
force of this trend significantly lessened between 1984 and 1997. During
the first 195 Chartercases decided by the Supreme Court, Quebec had 8
statutes nullified, 5 of which occurred in policy areas important to the
129 See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 23-24, Table 8.
130 Supra note 105.
131 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 [hereinafter Libman].
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Quebec government. In 1984, Quebec suffered two judicial nullifications
of education policy in Quebec ProtestantSchool Boardsl 32 and Quebec v.
Greater Hull School Board.133 In 1988, the Supreme Court nullified
sections of the Charterof the French Language3 4 that restricted the use
of English on public signs, in Ford 35 and Devine v. Quebec (A.G.).136
Such a use of the Charter antagonized Quebec and contributed to the
constitutional crisis associated with the demise of the Meech Lake
Accord.137 However, since the defeat of the Meech Lake and the
Charlottetown Accords, the Charterhas not been used to successfully
challenge Quebec's autonomy in language and education policy. In
particular, the Court has not used the Charter to nullify Quebec's
language and education policy since Ford in 1988, and in the one case
involving Quebec's education policy decided between 1993 and 1997, the
Court supported Quebec in Reference Re EducationAct (Que.).138 Even
in Libman,139 where the Court nullified sections of Quebec's referendum
law that limited third-party spending, the Court struck down the Quebec
Act on very narrow procedural grounds. However, in response to
Libman, the National Assembly introduced amendments to the
Referendum Act 140 that dealt with the Court's concern that the spending
limitation for third-party participants was too low. While it is recognized
that striking down sections of the referendum law create a powerful
symbolic statement that Canadian federalism and the Charter treat
Quebec unfairly, the reality of the Charter'seffect on Quebec since 1988
is markedly different from Chartersymbolism or political rhetoric. The
Court has generally been supportive of provincial policy since 1990, but
more importantly, the Court has steered clear of the politics of language
13 2

Supra note 98.

133 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 575.
13 4

Supra note 95.

13

5 Supra note 96.
136 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 790.
137 See S.V. LaSelva, The Moral Foundations of Canadian Federalism: Paradoxes,

Achievements, and Tragedies of Nationhood (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996) at
87-88, 97-98; J.L. Hiebert, Limiting Rights: The Dilemma of Judicial Review (Montreal: McGillQueen's University Press, 1996) at 130-32; F.L. Morton, "The Effect of the Charter of Rights on
Canadian Federalism" (1995) 25 Publius: J. Fed. 173 at 178-80; and P.A. Chapman, "The Politics of
Judging: Section 1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall L.J. 867 at 88081.
13 8

Supra note 102.

13 9

Supra note 131.

140 R.S.Q., c. C-64.1.
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in Canada. In cases where the Court has supported minority language
rights, such as Mahj74' and Reference Re Public Schools Act (Man.),142
the Charter has antagonized provincial governments, 43 but the Court
has sent an important message to Quebec: the Charterwill not be used to
interfere with provincial autonomy over language policy in Quebec, but
it will be used to protect the French language outside of Quebec by
requiring other provincial governments to provide minority language
education services.
In sum, several important developments in the 1993-1997 period
have strengthened the legitimacy of Charter review and the federal
character of Canada. More importantly, the Court has retreated into a
style of Charter review that focuses largely on the conduct of public
officials. Further, the success rate against statutes and regulations has
declined since 1984. This is important for two reasons: first, the Court is
becoming more deferential to the policy choices of legislative actors; and
second, it implies that democratic actors and the administrative state are
reflecting on the Court's Charter jurisprudence and redesigning the
development of policy to ensure that statutes and regulations are
consistent with the Charter. Indeed, while the change in focus by the
Supreme Court is a significant development, the limited number of
provincial Acts reviewed and nullified stands out as well. Without the
significant growth rate in Aboriginal rights cases decided by the Supreme
Court, the number of provincial Acts nullified in the 1993-1997 period
would have only been five. Further, two of the remaining five provincial
Acts nullified during this period involved the constitutionality of judicial
salaries. We can conclude, then, that the Court became more balanced
in its treatment of federal and provincial statutes, both quantitatively
and qualitatively between 1992 and 1997, and that the centralizing effect
of the Charteron provincial policy was not a notable feature of Charter
review in this period.
F. JudicialDiscretionand Liberal Constitutionalism:
The Court's Use of Sections I and 24(2)
The Charter provides courts in Canada with two highly
discretionary powers that allow them to engage in a two-stage review of
141 Supra note 108.
142

Supra note 105.

143 See 1. Urquhart, "Infertile Soil? Sowing the Charter in Alberta" in Schneiderman &
Sutherland, eds., supra note 99, 34 at 37-39, 41-42.
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cases that infringe entrenched rights or freedoms. It permits courts to
determine whether restrictions on rights and freedoms constitute
reasonable limitations in a free and democratic society pursuant to
section 1, and second, it permits courts to exclude evidence in criminal
cases under section 24(2) if it is determined that admitting such evidence
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Indeed, because
of the highly discretionary nature of sections 1 and 24(2), their use
provides an accurate measure of judicial activism under the Charterand
the judicialization of politics in Canada. The importance of section 1 is
that it provides a mechanism whereby values not enumerated in the
Charter can be reconciled with entrenched rights and freedoms, thus
according governments a degree of deference when policies reflect nonenumerated values.1 44 The reasonable limits clause allows for
restrictions on enumerated rights and freedoms if they can be
"demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." In R. v.
Oakes,145 the Court developed guidelines for determining whether a
limitation was justified in a free and democratic society. The Oakes test
consists of two parts. First, governments must demonstrate that a
limitation is pressing and substantial. Second, once a sufficiently
important objective is identified, the state must demonstrate that the
means chosen are proportionate to the ends. The initial restrictive
construction of reasonable limitations in Oakes made it difficult for
governments to demonstrate that legislative means chosen to implement
public policies represented a minimal impairment of Charter rights.14 6
Since Oakes, the Court has redefined the test in a way that incorporates
greater judicial deference to the policy choices of government. Judicial
modifications to the Oakes test have led to higher success rates for
government actors attempting to justify legal expressions of public policy
as reasonable limitations.
Table 9, below, summarizes the Supreme Court's use of section 1
between 1984 and 1997. The trends identified in the 1994 study
continue, with the Court more likely to reject governments attempting to
justify laws as a reasonable limitation (28) than to accept them (44): this
amounts to a 61 per cent failure rate for governments seeking to rely on
section 1 to uphold laws.

144 See J.L. Hiebert, "The Evolution of the Limitation'Clause" (1992) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J.

103 at 104-05; and P.W. Hogg, "Section 1 Revisited" (1991) 1 N.J.C.L. 1 at 18-19.
145 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter Oakes].
146 See P.J. Monahan, "The Charter Then and Now" in Bryden, Davis & Russell, eds., supra
note 47, 105 at 111-12 [hereinafter "Charter: Then and Now"I.
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TABLE 9
THE SECTION 1 REASONABLE LIMITS DEFENCE BY YEAR
'84 '85 '86 '87 '88 '89 '90 '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 Total
Accepted
(Gov't wins)

0

1 2

1

1

2

3

0

28

6 8

4

2

3

2

1

3

44

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

4

0

2

0

5

4 7

Rejected
1 3
(Claimant wins)

2

2

4

3

Both

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

Within this overall trend, volatile shifts emerge in the Court's use
of section 1 in specific time periods. The Court's reluctance to accept
section 1 defences occurred during its initial activist approach to rights
and freedoms, which Monahan has characterized as a period when the
Court interpreted rights and freedoms broadly and limitations
narrowly. 14 7 During the Court's activist approach to the Charter, only
two of the first ten section 1 defences (1984 to 1987) were accepted by
the Supreme Court. The decline of the Court's activism is reflected in
the success rates for section 1 defences. In the three-year period between
1988 and 1990, the Court accepted 55 per cent (16) of the 29 section 1
defences presented by government. However, between 1984 and 1992
the Court accepted 39 per cent (21) of the section 1 defences presented
by government.1 48 The Court's use of section I between 1993 and 1997,
where it accepted 39 per cent (7) of the 18 section I defences raised, is
similar to the first 195 Charterdecisions.
The Court's greater willingness to accept section 1 defences is
evidence of the breakdown of the initial "honeymoon" consensus on the
Charter.In effect, this breakdown reflected a movement from activism to
moderate activism. To explain the reduction in success rates for Charter
claimants, the studies by Beatty and those by Morton, Russell, and
Riddell pointed to the Court as the catalyst for lower success rates. In
Beatty's view, the movement from a Trudeau to a Mulroney Court
substituted liberal with conservative judges who were more reluctant to
support Charter challenges against government legislation. Morton,
Russell, and Riddell identified the weakness in Beatty's "Conservative
Court" thesis by demonstrating the difficulty in labelling judges as
conservative or liberal: the 1994 study showed that the "liberal" Trudeau
147

See "Charter. Then and Now,"supra note 146 at 111.

148 See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supranote 4 at 30, Table 9.
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judges exhibited conservative tendencies after the initial period of
activism, and that several of the "conservative" Mulroney appointments
were as liberal as the Trudeau judges. While the two studies disagree
concerning the specific changes responsible for the declining success
rate, they agree that the Court's approach to the Charter is the most
important factor in this development.
Morton, Russell, and Riddell successfully demonstrated the
weaknesses in Beatty's thesis, but they offered an incomplete
explanation that rests too heavily on jurisprudential changes within the
Court. The previous section demonstrated that the success rate for
Charterchallenges against statutes has continually declined since 1984.
Indeed, between 1993 and 1997 the success rate against statutes declined
to 30 per cent (19/63), a value lower than the overall success rate of 34
per cent. In contrast, the Court's acceptance of section 1 defences has
remained constant at 39 per cent between 1984 and 1997, suggesting that
a gap exists between these two trends. This gap suggests that the decline
in judicial activism is not the primary explanation for the declining
success rate against statutes and regulations. The Court's acceptance of
section 1 defences has not increased to a level that accounts for the
trend in Charterchallenges involving statutes. What may have happened
is a process of bureaucratic activism in which the administrative state
engaged in a process of risk assessment of public policy to minimize the
judicial nullification of statutes. Changes made within the administrative
state to accommodate Chartervalues in public policy, combined with the
Court's restructured Charterjurisprudence, likely account for declining
success rates against challenged statutes and regulations. 149
Table 10, below, summarizes the Court's use of section 24(2)
between 1984 and 1997. Section 24(2) is another highly discretionary
Charter section because it instructs judges to exclude evidence that
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. There have
been dramatic changes in the Court's approach to section 24(2) that
suggest the Court is moving back towards the crime control model that
characterized Canada's criminal law processes before the introduction of

149 See J.B. Kelly, Charter Activism and Canadian Federalism: Rebalancing Liberal
Constitutionalism in Canada, 1982 to 1997 (Ph.D. Thesis, McGill University, 1998) at 329-77
[unpublished]; and P.J. Monahan & M. Finkelstein, "The Charter of Rights and Public Policy in
Canada" (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L.J. 501.
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the Charter. F.L. Morton 5 0 and Christopher Manfredi]Si conclude that
one effect of the Charter is a restructuring of the Canadian process of
criminal law from the crime control model of British legal jurisprudence
to the due process model of American legal jurisprudence. This
conclusion is based on the Court's use of section 24(2) in the first 195
Charterdecisions, where the Court was more willing to exclude evidence
(20) than to allow it (14).1s2 This trend has not continued through the
first 352 Charter decisions. Indeed, the Court refused to exclude
evidence in 56 per cent (38) of the 68 cases in which section 24(2)
requests were made between 1984 and 1997. This reversal is even more
pronounced in the 157 Chartercases decided by the Court between 1993
and 1997: the Court admitted evidence in 71 per cent (24) of the 34
cases in which section 24(2) arguments were raised.
TABLE 10
MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
'84 '85 '86 '87 '88 '89 '90 '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 Total
Rejected
0
(Crown Wins)

0

0

3

3

1

2

2

3

7

3

5

7

2

38

Accepted
0
(Claimant Wins)

1

1

4

3

3

4

3

1

1

5

1

1

2

30

Issue Not
Addressed

0

0

2

2

2

0

1

0

0

1

0

08

0

The Court approached the Charter's discretionary powers in a
more restrained manner over the course of the first 352 Charter
decisions. While the Court was still less willing to accept section 1
defences, it has grown more even-handed in its approach to this
discretionary power since the initial period of activism. The 1994 study
was correct in stating that the two discretionary powers are an important
indication of the level of judicialization under the Charter. With the
stabilization of the Court's use of section 1 and the sharp decline in the
exclusion of evidence in criminal cases, the judicialization of politics has
been significantly reduced in Canada.
150 See F.L. Morton, "The Political Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms"
(1987) 20 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 31 at 33.

151 See C.P. Manfredi, "The Use of United States Decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada
Under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1990) 23 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 499 at 515-16.
152 See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 31, Table 10.
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G. The Return to CharterConsensus on the Supreme Court
Growing dissent on the Court marked the first 195 Charter
decisions. In particular, the rate of unanimous decisions by the Court
was 65 per cent for the first one hundred Charterdecisions. This declined
to 59 per cent for the first 195 Charterdecisions.1 5 3 A notable trend in
the 157 Charterdecisions released by the Supreme Court between 1993
and 1997 is the return to a much higher rate of unanimity. During this
period, the Court was unanimous in 69 per cent (108/157) of its Charter
decisions, resulting in an overall level of unanimity of 64 per cent for the
first 352 Chartercases. There are a number of explanations that account
for the return to unanimity in Chartercases by the Supreme Court. First,
the Court's membership was relatively stable between 1993 and 1997, the
only changes being the retirement of Stevenson and La Forest JJ. and
the appointment of Major and Bastarache JJ. This stands in direct
contrast to the 1987-1992 period, when seven judges on the Court were
replaced.
The 1993-1997 period was the first time since the inception of
the Charter that the Court's membership has been stable for a relatively
long period of time. This factor no doubt contributed to a growing
Charterconsensus on the Court. Second, and what is probably a more
important explanation, the focus of the Court has largely been on
procedural questions concerned with the conduct of public officials.
Procedural questions are less likely to divide the Court than substantive
policy issues that arise frequently when the Court focuses on challenges
to statutes. Cases raising substantive policy issues are most likely to raise
questions about the legitimacy of the Court's invalidation of the
decisions of legislative majorities. Indeed, it is not surprising that during
the period when the Court began to focus on statutes the number of
unanimous Charter decisions declined sharply. The 1994 study found
that in the 1990-1992 period the level of unanimity declined to 56 per
cent. 15 4 This period marks the first time the Court focused largely on
statutes. The Court is becoming more strategic in the selection of its
Charterdocket, and the effect has been to minimize divisions on the
Court by focusing on procedural questions that maximize the
institutional resources of judicial actors. In turn, this minimizes the areas
of conflict between the judicial and the legislative branches of

153 Ibid. at 33, Table 11. A decision is considered unanimous if all judges supported the
outcome of a case, even if separate concurring reasons were written.
154 Ibid. at 32.
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government and reduces the "paradox of liberal constitutionalism"
identified by Manfredi.' 55
TABLE 11
UNANIMITY IN CHARTER CASES, 1993-1997

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1984-1997
1984-1992
1993-1997

Charter
Decisions

Unanimous
Decisions

Per Cent
Unanimous

43
25
26
40
23

32
15
17
29
15

74
60
65
73
65

352
195
157

224
116
108

64
59
69

The growing unanimity has seen a corresponding decline in the
number of written opinions for Charterdecisions. The average number
of written decisions for the first 195 Charter decisions was 2.31,156 and
this declined to 2.10 for the 157 Charter cases decided by the Supreme
Court between 1993 and 1997. More importantly, the number of
concurring and dissenting opinions show a downward trend as well.
Concurring opinions send mixed messages to lower courts and
democratic actors because they dilute the clarity of judicial rules for
interpreting the Charter. The 1994 study factored out single-opinion
decisions (87) to demonstrate the important effect of concurring and
dissenting opinions sending mixed signals to lower courts and
democratic actors. The average number of written opinions for the
remaining decisions in the 1994 study averaged 3.4,157 more than a full
decision higher than the overall average for the 1984-1992 period of
2.31. This value declined slightly to 3.2 opinions for the first 352 Charter
decisions. For the 157 Charter cases decided between 1993 and 1997, the
number of written opinions declined to 3.0.

15 5

See JudicialPowerand the Charter,supra note 14.

156 See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 34, Table 11 a.
157 Ibid. at 33.
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TABLE 12
NUMBER OF WRITTEN OPINIONS PER CHARTER CASE

CharterDecisions Number of Opinions
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1984-1997
1984-1992
1993-1997

Number of Opinions
per Case

43
25
26
40
23

86
58
69
77
41

2.00
2.32
2.65
1.93
1.78

352
195
157

782
451
331

2.22
2.31
2.10

The growing Charterconsensus on the Supreme Court stands in
direct contrast to the experience of the United States Supreme Court,
where the level of unanimity on Bill of Rights cases has remained at 25
per cent for the past four decades.IS& The consensus in Canada can be
explained by stability in the Court's membership, but also by the
repositioning of the Court withih liberal constitutionalism that occurred
after 1990. Since the constitutional crisis of 1990-1992, when the
judicialization of politics intensified, the Court has retreated into a less
confrontational relationship with democratic actors. More importantly,
the higher rate of unanimity in Chartercases suggests that the Court has
found a style of judicial review under the Charter with which it is
comfortable. This rebalancing of liberal constitutionalism has maximized
the Court's institutional resources, and this has contributed to a
rebuilding of the Court's legitimacy that suffered during the
constitutional crisis of 1990-1992. What may be the most important
indicator of this rebalancing is the notable absence of criticism against
the Court's interpretation of constitutional rights by legislative actors
since 1992. Indeed, it was not until Delgamuukw,159 in late 1997, and
Vriend v. Alberta, 60 in 1998, that the Court was loudly criticized in
certain circles. Elected officials criticized the Court between 1993 and

158 Ibid. at 34.
15 9

Supra note 8.

160 [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493.
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1997, but it was primarily in relation to the Court's perceived favourable
treatment of the rights of the accused, most notably in R. v. Feeney.161
H. Different JudicialApproaches to Rights and Freedoms
Seventeen individuals sat on the Supreme Court between 1984
and 1997. Only Lamer C.J. was a member of the Court for this entire
period. Table 13162 summarizes the voting records of the judges who sat
on the Supreme Court between 1984 and 1997. The support rates in
Table 13 are different from the 1994 study by Morton, Russell, and
Riddell because oral judgments are included in the voting patterns of
individual judges.1 63 Madam Justice Wilson was the most activist judge
to preside over Chartercases, with a 55 per cent support rate for Charter
claimants, followed by Estey J. (44 per cent) and Le Dain J. (43 per
cent). Chief Justice Lamer was the second most activist judge between
1984 and 1992 at 46 per cent, but his activism declined significantly
between 1993 and 1997, moving the chief justice to fifth place overall in
support for Charter claimants for the first 352 Charterdecisions. At the
other end of the spectrum, McIntyre J. was the most self-restrained
member of the Court at 22 per cent, followed by Gonthie'r J. at 26 per
cent. Madam Justice McLachlin replaced Sopinka J. as the most activist
Mulroney appointment on the Court at 39 per cent, but both judges
declined in their activism after 1992. This trend of declining support
rates for Charterclaimants is a common characteristic of the individual
judges who sat on the Court between 1993 and 1997. Judges who
remained below the Court average of 34 per cent, along with McIntyre

161 [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13.

162 See Appendix 3, below.
163 The 1994 study by Morton, Russell, and Riddell excluded oral judgments when calculating
individual judges' support rates for Charter claimants. The number of excluded oral judgments

between 1984 and 1992 was 7, or 3.5 per cent of the 195 Chartercases. Between 1993 and 1997, oral
judgments constituted 26 per cent, or 39 of the 157 Charter cases decided in this period. Most

importantly, oral judgments overwhelmingly involved legal rights cases and represented losses for
Charterclaimants. We decided to include oral judgments in the individual voting record of judges
because excluding such a large number of cases would overrepresent individual judges' support

rates for Charterclaimants. For example, excluding oral judgments between 1984 and 1997 would
see Lamer C.J.'s support for the rights claimant increase from 37 to 43 per cent. In fact, if oral

judgments are excluded, only Stevenson and McIntyre JJ. would have support rates for Charter
claimants below the overall average of 34 per cent. While oral judgments do not show anything

about the jurisprudential tendencies of the Court, their exclusion misrepresents the voting patterns
of individual judges.
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and Gonthier JJ., included Stevenson J. (28 per cent), L'Heureux-Dub6
J. (32 per cent), and Bastarache J. (0).
Table 13 provides an opportunity to re-evaluate Beatty's
suggestion that the decline in activism is the result of conservative
judicial appointments by the Mulroney government. Similar to results of
the 1994 study, the data from the 1993-1997 period shows that the
Mulroney appQintments exhibited varying levels of activism and selfrestraint, which casts doubt on Beatty's claim that there are two
ideological voting blocs on the Supreme Court. Indeed, the range in
support levels for Charter claimants between the most activist Mulroney
appointment (McLachlin J.) and the least activist (Gonthier J.) is 13 per
cent for the 1984-1997 period, whereas the difference in support levels
between the Trudeau appointments at each end of the spectrum (Wilson
and McIntyre JJ.) is 33 per cent. The small percentage separating the
Mulroney appointments and the close proximity of their support rates
for Charterclaimants to the Court average reinforce the 1994 study's
conclusion that the result of moving from a Trudeau to a Mulroney
Court has not been the entrenchment of a "Conservative Court,"164 but
rather "a consolidation of the dominance of the Court's grey middle." 165
The emergence of a centre-dominant Court becomes much
clearer when the voting patterns of the judges on the Supreme Court in
1997 are examined. Madam Justice McLachlin and Lamer C.J. were the
most activist judges in the 1993-1997 period at 38 per cent, but the most
important trend that emerges is that most judges fall within a relatively
narrow range of support for Charterclaimants: only Gonthier J. (24 per
cent) falls outside a range of 5 per cent from the Court average of 34 per
cent. Thus, the convergence of individual judges towards the Court
average reinforces the centre-dominant characterization of the Supreme
Court. This convergence is directly linked to the growing consensus on
the Supreme Court, and this clearly differentiates the Court from the
United States Supreme Court, which has been characterized by
ideological polarization since the Nixon administration.
The growing consensus on the Supreme Court has seen the
number of dissents decrease from 12 per cent for the first 195 Charter
decisions to 10 per cent between 1984 and 1997. Similar to the 1994
study, the three women judges on the Court continue to be the most
frequent dissenters. Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 was the most
frequent dissenter among them at 22 per cent, followed by Wilson J. (19
164

See "Conservative Court," supra note 19.

165 Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 39.
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per cent) and McLachlin J. (16 per cent). What continues to differentiate
the women judges is the direction of the dissents. Madam Justice
Wilson's 25 dissents all favoured the rights claimant, while L'HeureuxDub6 J. was more likely to favour state actors. A notable trend that
emerges among the women judges presently on the Court is the relative
balance in the direction of their dissents: 58 per cent of L'Heureux-Dub6
J.'s dissents supported state actors (28/48), as did 41 per cent (13/32) of
McLachlin J.'s dissents.
TABLE 13A
JUDGES' SUPPORT RATE FOR CHARTER

CLAIMANTS BY YEAR, 1993-1997
1993

1994

(%)
McLachlin
Lamer
Sopinka
Iacobucci
Cory
Major
L'Heureux-Dub6
La Forest
Gonthier
Bastarache
The Court

1995

(%)

1996

(%)

1997

(%)

Total

(%)

29
(n=41)
23
(n=30)

38
41
(n=25) (n=21)
54
26
(n=24) (n=19)

47
(n=33)
25
(n=26)

37
(n=19)
58
(n=19)

38
(n=139)
38
(n=118)

24
(n=41)
31
(n=39)
26
(n=38)
26
(n=23)

48
(n=25)
46
(n=24)
50
(n=24)
37
(n=22)

35
(n=26)
33
(n=24)
31
(n=26)
30
(n=23)

30
(n=36)
29
(n=34)
28
(n=38)
34
(n=37)

59
(n=22)
54
(n=22)

37
(n=150)
36
(n=143)

57
(n=23)
50
(n=18)

36
(n=149)
35
(n=123)

27
(n=37)
28
(n=36)
20
(n=35)
n/a

11
(n=20)
29
(n=24)
17
(n=24)
n/a

36
(n=22)
24
(n=21)
20
(n=25)
n/a

42
29
36
(n=27) (n=19) (n=125)
21
(n=31)
26
(n=38)
n/a

56
(n=18)
40
(n=20)
0
(n=2)

29
(n=130)
24
(n=142)
0
(n=2)

34
28
57
23
44
31
(n=43) (n=25) (n=26) (n=40) (n=23) (n=157)

n=number of cases in which ajudge participated.
%=per cent of'n' in which a judge supported the Charter claimant (does not count results that were
classified as "inconclusive").
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TABLE 14
DISSENTS, 1984-1997
ORIENTATION:
VOTE
Outcome of Majority
Decisions(a)

# Dissents
L'Heureux-Dub6
Wilson
McLachlin
McIntyre
La Forest
Lamer
Estey
Gonthier
Sopinka
Cory
Major
Dickson
Stevenson
Beetz
lacobucci
Le Dain
Bastarache
1984-1997
1984-1992
1993-1997

Total Cases % Dissents

Claimant
Wins

State
Wins

52
25
35
12
30
25
3
19
19
16
8
8
2
3
8
1
0

240
132
217
80
286
279
34
231
253
231
123
123
2
62
181
42
2

22
19
16
15
10
9
9
8
8
7
7
7
7
5
4
2
0

28
0
13
11
15
6
1
15
3
6
4
3
1
1
4
1
0

20
25
19
1
14
18
2
3
13
9
4
5
1
2
4
0
0

266
157
109

2545
1324
1221

10
12
9

112
46
66

140
99
41

(a) Majority outcomes classified as "inconclusive" are not counted. Therefore, the addition of
"claimant wins" and "state wins" columns for individual judges may in some instances not add up to
the total number of dissents.

The 1994 study found that Lamer C.J. was less successful than
Dickson C.J. in building consensus on the Court. This changed during
the 1993-1997 period. 6 6 During the first 195 Charter decisions, Lamer
C.J. was the second most activist judge on the Court, and dissented in 13
per cent of cases, a rate almost twice that of Dickson C.J.167 Based on
such findings, the 1994 study concluded that "Lamer has been less

166 For a discussion of voting blocs on the Lamer Court, see P. McCormick, "Birds of a

Feather: Alliances and Influences on the Lamer Court 1990-1997" (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall L.J. 339.
167See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 39, Table 14.
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interested in or less able to continue the consensus-maker role of Chief
Justice that Dickson had created." 168 In this sense, it is appropriate to
view the Supreme Court of the 1990s as "Lamer's Court," as Lamer C.J.
replicated Dickson C.J.'s role as an "activist-leaning leader on the
Court" in the 1993-1997 period. 169 For instance, Lamer C.J.'s rate of
support for Charterclaimants for the first 352 Charterdecisions was 37
per cent, which was very close to the overall average of 34 per cent.
Second, his rate of dissent decreased in the overall statistics from 13 per
cent (1984-1992) to 9 per cent for the first 352 Charterdecisions. The
rate of dissent for Lamer C.J. between 1993 and 1997 was 4 per cent; this
is lower than Dickson C.J.'s level of dissent at 7 per cent. The changes in
Lamer C.J.'s approach to the Chartersuggest he played a predominant
role in the emergence of a centre-dominant Court in Canada. Chief
Justice Lamer moved from the activist-periphery of the Court to a
consensus-making role within the narrow range of the Court average.
TABLE 14A
VOTE ORIENTATION: DISSENTS, 1993-1997

# Dissents Total Cases % Dissents
L'Heureux-Dub6
McLachlin
La Forest
Gonthier
Major
Lamer
Cory
Sopinka
Iacobucci
Bastarache
Total

29
21
17
14
8
5
6
5
4
0
109

125.
139
130
142
123
118
149
150.
143
2
1221

Outcome of Majority
Decisions(a)
Claimant
State
Wins
Wins

23
15
13
10
7
4
4
3
3
0

16
10
13
12
4
4
3
2
2
0

13
11
4
2
4
1
3
2
1
0

9

66

41

(a) Majority outcomes classified as "inconclusive" are not counted. Therefore, the addition of
"claimant wins" and "state wins" columns for individual judges may in some instances not add up to
the total number of dissents.

168 Ibid. at 40.
169 Ibid.
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There is an important change in the direction of dissents70 that
illustrates the Court's growing deference to the policy choices of
democratic actors and the rebalancing of liberal constitutionalism in the
1993-1997 period. During the first 195 Charter decisions, the judges on
the Supreme Court were likely to dissent when the majority decision
found no rights violation: 68 per cent of dissents in this period supported
the rights claimant (99/145),171 and this figure declined to 56 per cent
(140/252) for the first 352 Charter decisions. In an important change
during the 1993-1997 period, Supreme Court judges were less likely to
use dissenting or concurring opinions to urge a broader interpretation of
rights and freedoms. During this period, 62 per cent of dissents were
written when the majority supported the rights claimant, and dissents
overall were down to 9 per cent.- In other words, divisions on the Court
were more likely to occur when the Court ruled in favour of the rights
claimant.
TABLE 15
DIRECTION OF CHARTER INTERPRETATION IN DISSENTING
AND CONCURRING OPINIONS, 1993-1997

Broader (%)

Cory
Sopinka
McLachlin(a)
Lamer
L'Heureux-Dub6
Major
Iacobucci
La Forest(a)
Gonthier

32 (39)
33 (38)
28 (37)
26 (37)
25 (32)
22 (32)
24 (30)
24 (28)
18 (22)

Narrower

18
21
21
19
24
17
20
26
23

Same

32
32
26
26
30
31
36
36
40

(a) Justices McLachlin and La Forest each had one dissent or concurrence in which they expressed
both "broader" and "narrower" Charterinterpretations; therefore, one was added to both "broader"
and "narrower" categories.

When dissenting judges are more likely to favour the actions of state
actors and resist rulings that expand the meaning of rights and freedoms,
the Court's activism may be checked. As well, the pattern in dissenting
and concurring opinions of the Court (1993-1997) contrasts sharply with
the growing dissent that marked the Court between 1984 and 1992.

170 See Table 15, below.
171 See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 39, Table 14.
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Madam Justice Wilson attempted to broaden rights in 84 per cent of the
cases in which she dissented, and McIntyre J. attempted to narrow rights
in 71 per cent of his dissents.1 72 The polarization of the Dickson Court
was not replicated in the Lamer Court between 1993 and 1997.
TABLE 16
SECTION 1 REASONABLE LIMITS DEFENCE BY JUDGE, 1984-1997

Wilson
Stevenson
Lamer
McLachlin
Cory
Iacobucci
Sopinka
Estey
Dickson
Major
Beetz
La Forest
L'Heureux-Dub6
Gonthier
Le Dain
McIntyre
Bastarache

Per Cent
Not Reached

Per Cent
Saved

Per Cent
Not Saved

Number of
Cases

13 (n=7)
8 (n=1)
12 (n=10)
21 (n=11)
11 (n=6)
17 (n=7)
12 (n=8)
20 (n=2)
8 (n=4)
25 (n=5)
36 (n=9)
26 (n=23)
31 (n=23)
27 (n=17)
47 (n=7)
45 (n=5)
0 (n=0)

18 (n=10)
25 (n=3)
23 (n=19)
15 (n=8)
26 (n= 15)
20 (n=8)
27 (n=18)
20 (n=2)
41 (n=20)
25 (n=5)
16 (n=4)
29 (n=25)
24 (n=18)
35 (n=22)
20 (n=3)
23 (n=7)
0 (n=0)

69 (n=38)
67 (n=8)
65 (n=53)
64 (n=34)
63 (n=36)
63 (n=25)
61 (n=40)
60 (n=6)
51 (n=25
50 (n=10)
48 (n=12)
45 (n=39)
45 (n=33)
38 (n=24)
33 (n=5)
32 (n=10)
0 (n=0)

55
12
82
53
57
40
66
10
49
20
25
87
74
63
15
31
0

The use of the two discretionary powers in Charter cases by the
individual judges is outlined in Tables 16 and 17. The most activist
judges would be expected to use the discretionary powers in a way that
benefited the rights claimant, and the most restrained judges in a way
that supported government action. This trend holds for the most part in
Tables 16 and 17, with several notable exceptions. In the first 352 Charter
decisions, Wilson J. was the most activist judge in rejecting section 1
defences (69 per cent), followed closely by Stevenson J. (67 per cent),
Lamer C.J. (65 per cent), McLachlin J. (64 per cent), and Cory and
Iacobucci JJ. (63 per cent). When judges who participated in fewer than
ten section 24(2) cases are eliminated, Wilson J. was the most activist
supporter of Charterclaimants, excluding evidence 73 per cent of the
172 Ibid. at 40, Table 15.
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time. Justice La Forest was the second most activist judge in excluding
evidence (54 per cent), and Lamer C.J. followed at 49 per cent. In
contrast, McIntyre J. remained the most deferential judge on the Court,
rejecting section 1 arguments only 32 per cent of the time, and Gonthier
J. was the third most deferential judge at 38 per cent. Madam Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6 was the judge least likely to exclude evidence in section
24(2) cases: she excluded evidence only 18 per cent of the time. Her
closest rival was Major J. at 30 per cent.
TABLE 17
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE PER SECTION 24(2)
OF THE CHARTER BY JUDGE, 1984-1997

Estey
Wilson
Beetz
Le Dain
La Forest
Lamer
Dickson
Sopinka
Iacobucci
McIntyre
McLachlin
Gonthier
Stevenson
Cory
Major
L'Heureux-Dub6
Bastarache

Per Cent

PerCent

Per Cent

Number of

Not Reached

Admitted

Excluded

Cases(a)

0 (n=O)
0 (n=0)
0 (n=O)
0 (n=O)
5 (n=3)
11 (n=5)
0 (n=0)
8 (n=4)
3 (n=l)
0 (n=0)
9 (n=4)
6 (n=3)
0 (n=0)
4 (n=2)
20 (n=6)
15 (n=7)
0 (n=0)

0 (n=O)
27 (n=6)
40 (n=4)
43 (n=3)
41 (n=22)
40 (n=18)
53 (n=10)
49 (n=25)
57 (n=23)
62 (n=8)
55 (n=26)
62 (n=31)
67 (n=4)
64 (n=30)
50 (n=15)
67 (n=31)
100 (n=l)

100 (n=2)
73 (n=16)
60 (n=6)
57 (n=4)
54 (n=29)
49 (n=22)
47 (n=9)
43 (n=22)
40 (n=16)
38 (n=5)
36 (n=17)
32 (n=16)
33 (n=2)
32 (n=15)
30 (n=9)
18 (n=8)
0 (n=O)

2
22
10
7
54
45
19
51
40
13
47
50
6
47
30
46
1

(a) If any member of the Court addressed a section 1 or section 24(2) issue in a decision, then each
judge in that decision was coded on the section 1 and section 24(2) issue.

The patterns between the least activist and the most activist
members of the Court hold for the most part in Tables 16 and 17. But
what becomes apparent when examining these tables is that the
individual judges' activism in section 1 and section 24(2) cases is
characterized by a great deal of movement. This is especially true of
Stevenson, Cory, and La Forest JJ.: Stevenson and Cory JJ. were very
activist in rejecting section 1 defences, but showed far more deference to
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government by refusing to exclude evidence in most section 24(2)
motions, whereas La Forest J. was consistently more receptive to section
1 defences, but more willing to exclude evidence. The 1994 study states
that this contradictory pattern in the two discretionary powers
"suggest[s] that Judges tend not to be as sharply or as predictably
divided on these openly discretionary Charter issues as they are in
interpreting the meaning and scope of the rights and freedoms
themselves."17 3 This conclusion still characterizes the patterns exhibited
by the judges in their use of sections 1 and 24(2), and reconfirms the
suggestion that the individual judges' voting records in criminal cases is
often different from their voting records in non-criminal cases.
I. Different JudicialApproachesto Criminaland Non-Criminal
Cases: The CourtParty and CriminalRights Indices
To test whether individual judges on the Supreme Court
approached criminal rights cases differently from non-criminal cases, the
1994 study created two sub-indices of Charterdecisions: a criminal rights
index and a "Court Party" index. For the first 352 Charter decisions, the
criminal rights index has 189 cases and the Court Party index has 80
cases. The criminal rights index consists of all Supreme Court Charter
decisions involving legal rights (sections 7-14 of the Charter) and the
federal Criminal Code or related federal criminal statutes, such as the
Narcotic ControlAct.174 The Court Party index was based on a concept
developed by Morton and Knopff to explain the increased use of Charter
litigation by interest groups to advance specialized policy agendas.175
Morton has argued that the judicialization of politics in Canada has
created a "Charter Revolution," which is sustained by the Court Party
and its use of the courts to bypass traditional democratic arenas.1 76 The
Court Party is distinct from traditional interest groups because it is
organized around sections of the Charter, and consists of the new
constitutional stakeholders that identify with the Constitution Act,
1982.177 Alan Cairns labelled these new groups "CharterCanadians" in
173 Ibid. at 43.
174 R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1. See Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 43ff for a more
detailed discussion.
175 See "Canada's Court Party," supra note 42 at 72-73.
176 See "Supreme Court as Vanguard," supra note 14 at 58-59.
177 See F.L. Morton, "The Charter Revolution and the Court Party" (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall

L.J. 627 at 630 [hereinafter "The Charter Revolution"].
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his account of the phenomenon of constitutional minoritarianism
advanced by the new constitutional order.1 78
The Court Party roughly corresponds to Cairns' Charter
Canadians, with a number of important differences. The Court Party is
postmaterialist in both its membership and in its policy goals. 79 Morton
and Knopff have described the Court Party as being "rooted in a 'new
class': the so-called postmaterialist or postindustrialist knowledge
class,"18 0 the "equality seekers" who attempt to reform society as a
whole. The issues that appeal to the Court Party include the rights of
linguistic and visible minorities, gay rights, feminism, Aboriginal rights,
environmentalism, and world peace: "In sum, the Court Party hypothesis
argues that both the adoption and the 'success' of the Charterreflect the
growing ascendancy of these postmaterialist interests in Canadian
society and their preference to pursue their policy agendas through
judicial politics (litigation) rather than through electoral-legislative
politics."181 For right-wing critics of the Charter, the Court Party
illustrates the undemocratic nature of Charterpolitics and the dangers of
judicial activism to liberal constitutionalism in Canada. The agenda of
the Court Party involves substantive policy issues that are increasingly
being decided by the courts, and for right-wing Chartercritics, the courts
lack both the institutional capacity and legitimacy in democratic politics
to decide such issues. Indeed, the Court Party embodies for right-wing
critics what is wrong with the Charter.the judicialization of politics,
judicial activism that sustains the "Charter Revolution," and
constitutional supremacy "that verges on judicial supremacy."18 2
The Court Party index is an important indicator of whether the
judiciary has used the Charter in a manner that promotes a
confrontational or deferential relationship between the judicial and
legislative branches of government. It may be the most important
indicator of judicial activism and the paradox of liberal constitutionalism
under the Charter.

178 See A.C. Cairns, "Constitutional Minoritarianism in Canada" in Williams, ed., supra note
77, 119 at 120.

179 See I. Brodie & N. Nevitte, "Evaluating the Citizens' Constitution Theory" (1993) 26 Can.
J. Pol. Sci. 235.

180 "Canada's Court Party," supranote 42 at 68.
181 Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 45.
182 "The Charter Revolution," supranote 177 at 627-28.
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The coding of Court Party cases involves special attention
because a "win" in a Court Party case might be coded as a "loss" in the
rest of the study. For example,
Jim Keegstra's unsuccessful challenge to the anti-hate provisions of the Criminal Code

was coded as a "win" for the Court Party, since the impugned provision was intended to
protect minorities and was defended before the Supreme Court by LEAF and several
other intervenors who are members of the Court Party coalition. For the same reasons

but to the opposite effect, Ernst Zundel's successful challenge to the false news provision
of the Code was coded as a Court Party "loss." 183

Table 18, below, summarizes the support rates of individual judges for
the criminal rights index and the Court Party index between 1984 and
1997. A trend that stands out in Table 18 is that several judges
demonstrate a tremendous amount of movement in support levels
between the two sub-indices. The most outstanding example is
L'Heureux-Dub6 J., who had the second highest support rate for Court
Party cases at 61 per cent, but the third lowest support rate for criminal
rights (26 per cent) for the first 352 Charter decisions. The sharp
differences in L'Heureux-Dub6 J.'s support rates were first identified in
the 1994 study, when her support rate for criminal rights was 11 per cent
below the Court average, and her support rate for the Court Party index
was 21 per cent above the Court average. 184 While this pattern
continued for L'Heureux-Dub6 J., the difference in her support levels
between the two sub-indices narrowed from 45 per cent (1984-1992) to
35 per cent (1984-1997).
The 1994 study identified Sopinka J. as another judge that
demonstrated varying support levels between the two sub-indices. The
pattern in Sopinka J.'s support levels held for the first 352 Charter
decisions, where he had the fourth highest support rate for criminal
rights (47 per cent), and the third lowest support rate for the Court Party
(34 per cent). Once again, the difference between Sopinka J.'s support
levels narrowed from 29 per cent for the first 195 Charter
decisions-criminal rights (60 per cent) to Court Party (31 per
cent)185-to 13 per cent for the first 352 Charter decisions. A number of
judges showed very little difference in support levels between the two
sub-indices. The support levels for Le Dain, Cory, and Gonthier JJ. were
virtually identical, and Wilson J. had the highest level of support for both
criminal rights (61 per cent) and the Court Party (81 per cent). The
183 Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 45-46.

184 Ibid. at 46, Table 18.
185 Ibid.
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individual voting patterns of the judges demonstrate that the aggregate
data can be misleading because it hides important differences in how the
judges approach criminal and non-criminal cases. Indeed, the overall
voting patterns of Sopinka J. (37 per cent) and L'Heureux-Dub6 J. (32
per cent) would suggest that these two judges positioned themselves in
the centre-dominant part of the Court, when in fact they demonstrated
both activism and self-restraint in their approach to the Charter.
TABLE 18
RIGHTS CLAIMANT SUPPORT COMPARISON BY JUDGE: OVERALL
SUPPORT, CRIMINAL RIGHTS, "COURT PARTY," 1984-1997
PerCent
Overall Support

Per Cent
CriminalRights

Per Cent
CourtParty

Wilson
Estey
Le Dain
McLachlin
Sopinka
Lamer
Beetz
Cory
Major
Iacobucci
Dickson
La Forest
L'Heureux-Dub6
Stevenson
Gonthier
McIntyre
Bastarache

55 (n=132)
44 (n=34)
43 (n=42)
39 (n=217)
37 (n=253)
37 (n=279)
37 (n=62)
37 (n=231)
36 (n=123)
35 (n=181)
35 (n=123)
33 (n=286)
32 (n=240)
28 (n=29)
26 (n=231)
22 (n=80)
0 (n=2)

61 (n=67)
50 (n= 18)
39 (n=23)
36 (n=111)
47 (n= 120)
48 (n= 149)
33 (n=30)
39 (n=118)
40 (n=71)
38 (n=90)
41 (n=63)
40 (n= 147)
26 (n=123)
50 (n=10)
29 (n= 125)
19 (n=42)
0 (n=2)

81 (n=32)
56 (n=9)
38 (n=8)
56 (n=48)
34 (n=57)
45 (n=67)
53 (n=17)
41 (n=50)
47 (n=32)
34 (n=41)
57 (n=30)
34 (n=68)
61(n=59)
0 (n=3)
35 (n=52)
50 (n=18)
0 (n=O)

1984-1997
1984-1992
1993-1997

34 (n=352)
33 (n=195)
34 (n=157)

37 (n=189)
40 (n=99)
33 (n=90)

47 (n=80)
53 (n=36)
41 (n=44)

What stands out in the overall support rates for the two indices is
that the Court average for both the criminal rights index (37 per cent)
and the Court Party index (47 per cent) is above the overall average of
34 per cent for the first 352 Charterdecisions. The higher success rate for
the Court Party lends some support to right-wing criticisms of Charter
politics. The 1994 study concluded that the varying support levels
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between the two indices cast doubt on the conclusion that the Lamer
Court had become more centrist than the Dickson Court.186 The overall
trends in the first 352 Charter decisions suggest that the Court takes
different approaches to different parts of the Charter, sometimes
demonstrating activism, sometimes self-restraint.
If it is true that the aggregate data hides important differences in
the voting patterns of the judges between criminal rights and the Court
Party, it is equally true that it hides trends in the last 157 Charter
decisions (1993-1997) that demonstrate the emergence of a centredominant Court in Canada. In a sharp departure from the trends
identified in the 1994 study, the Court exhibited a growing level of
consistency in its approach to rights and freedoms. Specifically, the level
of support for criminal rights (33 per cent) was similar to the overall rate
of support (34 per cent) between 1993 and 1997, and the support for the
Court Party declined significantly from 53 per cent to 41 per cent in the
same period. The support for the Court Party's agenda has declined
among the individual judges. In fact, all judges on the Supreme Court,
with the exception of Sopinka and McLachlin JJ., exhibited declining
support rates for the Court Party after 1992. This is a significant change
from the first 195 Charterdecisions, where only Sopinka J.'s support for
the Court Party (31 per cent) was lower than the overall support rate for
Charter claims (33 per cent). What stands out in the subset of 157
Chartercases decided between 1993 and 1997 is that two-thirds of the
judges have support rates for the Court Party within 6 per cent of the
overall rate of support for Charterclaims in the same period (34 per
cent). Justices Gonthier and La Forest posted the lowest support rate for
the Court Party between 1993 and 1997 at 29 per cent and 32 per cent,
respectively, followed closely by Sopinka and Iacobucci JJ. (34 per cent),
Lamer C.J. (35 per cent), and Cory J. (40 per cent).
Justices Sopinka and L'Heureux-Dub6 continued to exhibit
varying levels of support between the two sub-indices. Madam Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6 had the second highest level of support for the Court
Party and the third lowest level of support for criminal rights. Similarly,
during his time on the bench, Sopinka J. continued to have one of the
highest levels of support for the legal rights of the accused at 47 per cent,
but demonstrated one of the lowest support levels for the Court Party.
Justice Gonthier emerged as a Charter conservative in the 1993-1997
period, changing direction from his activist approach to criminal rights
and the Court Party identified in the 1994 study. In particular, Gonthier
J.'s support for criminal rights decreased from 40 per cent (1984-1992)
186 Ibid. at 48.
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to 21 per cent (1993-1997), and his support for the Court Party also
decreased from 45 per cent to 29 per cent during the same time frames.
TABLE 18A
RIGHTS CLAIMANT SUPPORT COMPARISON BY JUDGE: OVERALL
SUPPORT, CRIMINAL RIGHTS, "COURT PARTY," 1993-1997
PerCent
Overall Support

Per Cent
CriminalRights

Per Cent
CourtParty

McLachlin
Lamer
Sopinka
Iacobucci
Cory
Major
L'Heureux-Dub6
La Forest
Gonthier
Bastarache

38
38
37
36
36
35
29
29
24

(n=139)
(n=118)
(n=150)
(n=143)
(n=149)
(n=123)
(n=125)
(n=130)
(n=142)
0 (n=2)

31 (n=72)
40 (n=62)
40 (n=80)
35 (n=73)
34 (n=82)
37 (n=72)
23 (n=68)
35 (n=69)
21 (n=80)
0 (n=2)

63 (n=39)
35 (n=39)
34 (n=41)
34 (n=38)
40 (n=40)
47 (n=32)
57 (n=40)
32 (n=43)
29 (n=41)
0 (n=0)

The Court

34 (n=157)

33 (n=90)

41 (n=44)

Despite the continued presence of activist judges at the edges,
the Court in the 1993-1997 period clearly emerged as a centrist court.
The close grouping of the judges around the median illustrates that the
Lamer Court was far more centrist than the Dickson Court. Many of the
judges have rates of support very close to the average in both criminal
rights and the overall rate of support, but the judges demonstrated a
more conservative approach to the Court Party between 1993 and 1997.
This last development puts into question the success of the Charter
revolution, and demonstrates the rebalancing of liberal constitutionalism
that intensified after 1992. Right-wing critics of the Charter have used
the presence and success of the Court Party as evidence of the dangers
of judicial activism to liberal constitutionalism in Canada. The decline in
the success rate of the Court Party is linked to an important
development during the 1993-1997 period that strengthens the
legitimacy of Charterreview: the greater focus by the Supreme Court on
the conduct of public officials, and the declining success rate of Charter
challenges to statutes. As the Court Party's agenda is substantive in
nature and usually concerned with challenges to the legislative choices of
democratic actors, the rebalancing of liberal constitutionalism in Canada
has seen a decline in the success rate of the Court Party. The Charter
history of the Court Party closely parallels the pattern of the Court's
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initial activist approach to rights and freedoms. After an initial period of
Court Party activism, the Supreme Court has settled into a moderately
activist approach to the Court Party's agenda.
In sum, the data presented in Tables 11 to 18 demonstrate the
growing consensus on the Supreme Court of Canada over the Charter,
and the role of the judiciary in a constitutional order with entrenched
rights and freedoms. The 1993-1997 period represents a return to a
unanimous approach to the Charter. However, what distinguishes this
return to unanimity from the 1984-1986 period is the direction of the
Court's approach to the Charter.In the initial period of unanimity the
Court was highly activist in its approach to the Charter, and this placed
the judiciary in a competitive, if not conflictual, relationship with the
legislative branch of government. The return to unanimity has not seen a
corresponding return to activism, but the emergence of a new,
cooperative relationship between the judicial and legislative branches of
government. The Court has broken away from the trends established in
the first 195 Charterdecisions by returning to a higher rate of unanimity,
a decreasing rate of dissents and concurring opinions, and a convergence
in the Court's support rates for criminal and non-criminal cases. There
continue to be activist judges, but the number has steadily declined to a
distinct minority on the Court. What may be more evident is that the
activist label can no longer be used to characterize the overall voting
pattern of an individual judge, but only certain aspects of that judge's
voting record on rights and freedoms. Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dub6
is the leading example of the qualified activist judge presently on the
Supreme Court: her approach to the Court Party index alone is
characterized by activism.
The 1994 study concluded that "[a] pragmatic and unpredictable
has emerged as the dominant characteristic of the Court's7
bloc
centre
18
voting behaviour at the end of the first decade of Charter decisions."
Much of the unpredictability was the result of the Court's tendency to sit
in panels of seven or fewer judges-a practice that characterized
approximately four-fifths of the Court's decisions in the first 195 Charter
cases.18 8 Indeed, the varying rates of support between the judges for
Charterrights led Heard to conclude that "the outcome of a Charter
claim argued in the Supreme Court of Canada depends to a very large
18 9
extent upon which judges sit on a panel that hears the appeal."

187 Ibid. at 51.
188 Ibid. at 52.
189 "The Charter in the Supreme Court," supra note 52 at 305.
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Heard's conclusion is even more important in light of the 1994 study's
finding that the judges approach criminal rights and non-criminal rights
cases differently. The practice of sitting in panels of seven or fewer
judges led to the perception of "different judges, different rights" in
Chartercases. 190 This practice declined sharply in the 1993-1997 period.
The Court sat in panels of seven or more judges in 83 per cent of Charter
cases decided. This change, combined with the growing consensus on the
Court and the centrism of the Lamer Court, has corrected a practice that
undermined the legitimacy of judicial review on Charter grounds.
Indeed, the convergence in support rates among the judges (see Table
18A, above) and the increased practice of sitting in full coutt has, since
1992, lessened the danger of "different judges, different rights."
TABLE 19
PANELS THAT DEALT WITH CHARTER CASES, 1993-1997
Panel

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Total

9
8
7
5
4

15
0
20
8
2

16
0
8
1
0

15
1
7
3
0

24
0
6
10
0

14
0
6
3
0

84
1
47
25
2

Total

43

25

26

40

23

159

IV. CONCLUSION: CANADIAN FEDERALISM AND THE
REBALANCING OF LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
The contours of the judicialization of politics changed in
important ways between 1984 and 1997. Indeed, it has been argued that
the Supreme Court of Canada restructured its approach to the Charter,
defined a new relationship for the Charterand federalism, and enhanced
the legitimacy of judicial review of rights and freedoms. The credibility
of the Court was increasingly questioned as a result of its growing
tendency in the 1984-1992 period to challenge important policy choices
of democratic actors and to nullify a higher proportion of provincial
statutes on substantive grounds. The trends in the first 352 Charter
decisions suggest both continuity and change from the first 195 Charter
decisions. The overall rate of support has remained constant at 34 per
190 Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 52.
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cent-a surprising development given the level of change in the Court's
approach to the Charter.
The overall trend, indicating continuity, masks important
changes that occurred between 1993 and 1997. The conclusion to be
drawn from the statistical analysis of the 157 Charter decisions in this
period is that the judicialization of politics has declined in the Canadian
context. This may not turn out to be an enduring feature of the Court's
approach to the Charter,but there are important indications that Charter
politics have moved into a period of ditente between the judicial and
legislative branches of government. The most important development in
this period is the changed focus of the Court from statutes and
regulations to the conduct of public officials. This is a significant
development because it is directly linked to the rebalancing of liberal
constitutionalism in Canada in the aftermath of the constitutional crisis
associated with the failure of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown
Accords. By focusing on the conduct of public officials, the Court has
retreated to a position that minimizes its confrontational relationship
with democratic actors. Indeed, much of the criticism levelled against the
Court during the first 195 Charter decisions was that the Court lacked
the institutional resources to challenge the substantive policy choices of
democratic actors. The focus of the Court in the 1993-1997 period
significantly transformed the Court's role as a policy actor. In particular,
the Court moved away from being an active participant in substantive
policy issues normally thought to be the prerogative of democratic
actors, to an actor mostly concerned with criminal policy. This shift
reduced the anti-democratic critique of judicial review, and increased
the legitimacy of the Court's role under the Charter.
The Charter'srelationship with federalism has benefited from the
change in focus by the Supreme Court. The Charter had a minimal
impact on federal diversity in the 1993-1997 period, with the nullification
of eight provincial statutes and regulations, and three nullifications
involving minor provincial regulations that restricted Aboriginal fishing
and hunting rights. It is true that the Charter'seffect on federal diversity
cannot be measured simply by the number of statutes nullified, but the
limited number of provincial statutes affected in this period does suggest
a minimal impact on provincial autonomy. Indeed, the Charter sections
that most implicate the Court in the politics of federalism-minority
language education rights, equality rights, and mobility rights-were the
subject of a small part of the Court's docket in the last 157 Supreme
Court Charter decisions. The lessons provided by the failure of the
Meech Lake Accord and by the Constitutional crisis of 1992 have not
gone unheeded by the Supreme Court.
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The movement away from directly challenging the legislative
branch of government has seen a rise in the level of unanimous rulings
released by the Supreme Court. In the past, substantive policy issues
deeply divided the Court between activist judges who favoured broad
interpretations of Charterrights and freedoms, and those judges who felt
the Court must be restrained in its application of the Charter to allow
democratic actors to govern effectively. In the final analysis, the Lamer
Court became more centrist than the Dickson Court, and this underlines
the rebalancing of liberal constitutionalism that began in 1990 and
accelerated after 1992.
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APPENDIX 1
The Supreme Court of Canada's first 352 Charterof Rights decisions:191
196. New Brunsvick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova

219. R v. Creighton, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3.

Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly),

220. R. v. Finlay, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 103.

[1993] 1 S.C.R. 319.

221. R. v. Naglik, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 122.

197. Baron v. Canada,[1993] 1 S.C.R. 416.

222. R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223.

198. Reference Re PublicSchools Act (Man.), s.

223. R. v. Wiley, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 263.

79(3), (4) and (7), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 839.
199. R. v. Douglas;R. v, Myers, [1993] 1 S.C.R.
893.
200. Dehghani v. Canada (Ministerof Employment
andImmigration), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1053.
201. R. v. Schiewe, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1134.
202. R. v. Goncalves, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 3.

224. R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281.
225. Rodriguez v. British Columbia (A.G.),
[1993] 3 S.C.R. 519.
226. R. v. B. (J.G.), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 643.
227. R. v. Yorke, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 647.
228. Hy and Zel's Inc. v. Ontario (A.G.),
[1993] 3 S.C.R. 675.

203. Kourtessisv. M.N.R., [1993] 2 S.C.R. 53.

229. R. v. Dersch, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 768.

204. Cunninghamv. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143.

230. Youngv. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3.

205. R. v. Hawkins, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 157.

231. P.(D.) v. S.(C.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 141.

206. R. v. Slaney, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 228.

232. R. v. Nuosci, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 283.

207. Sauvd v. Canada (A.G.), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 438.

233. R. v. Brassard,[1993] 4 S.C.R. 287.

208. R. v. D.(A.), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 441.

234. R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419.

209. Reference Re EducationAct (Que.), [1993] 2

235. R. v. Levogiannis, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 475.

S.C.R. 511.
210. R. v. Erickson,[1993] 2 S.C.R. 649.

236. R. v. L(L.R.) and T.(E.), [1993] 4 S.C.R.
504.

211. R. v. Macooh, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 802.

237. R v. Osolin, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595.

212. R. v. Gallagher, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 861.

238. Symes v. Canada, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695.

213. R. v. Frazer, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 866.

239. R. v. Colarusso,[1994] 1 S.C.R. 20.

214. Weatherallv. Canada (A.G.), [1993] 2 S.C.R.

240. ILW , Local 500 v. Canada,[1994] 1

872.

S.C.R. 150.

215. R. v. Potvin, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 880.

241. R. v. Durette, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 469.

216. R. v. Brown, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 918.

242. R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701.

217. Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer),

243. R. v.Jones, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 229.

[1993] 2 S.C.R. 995.
218. Ramsden v. Peterborough (City of), [1993] 2
S.C.R. 1084.

244. R. v. Howard, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 299.
245. Comitiparitairede l'industriede la
chemise v. Potash,[1994] 2 S.C.R. 406.

191 Cases 1-195 can be found in Appendix 1 in Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4. The
case total includes Aboriginal rights cases based on section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982;
language and education rights cases based on section 93 and 133 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867; the
Manitoba Act, S.C. 1870, c. 3, s. 23; and the SaskatchewanAct, S.C. 1905, c. 42, s. 16. A detailed
explanation and the rules for the deciding what cases "count" for the purpose of this study can be
found in Morton, Russell & Withey, supra note 5 at 49-53.
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246. P v. McIntyre, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 480.
247. R. v. Boersma, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 488.
248. R. v. Whittle, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914.
249. R. v. Tran, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 951.
250. R. v. Daviault, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63.
251. P v. Borden, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 145.
252. P v. Bartle, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173.
253. R. v. Prosper,[1994] 3 S.C.R. 236.
254. R. v. Pozniak, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 310.
255. K v. Matheson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 328.
256. K v. Harper,[1994] 3 S.C.R. 343.
257. R. v. Cobham, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 360.
258. Native Women's Assn. of Canadav. Canada,
[1994] 3 S.C.R. 627.
259. K v. Brown, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 749.
260. R. v. Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761.
261. Dagenaisv. CanadianBroadcastingCorp.,
[1994] 3 S.C.R. 835.
262.R. v. Laba, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 965.
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1018.
264. B. (R.) v. Children'sAid Society of
Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315.
265. R. v. Simpson, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 449.
266. R. v. S. (R.J.), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 451
267. K v. Crawford,[1995] 1 S.C.R. 858.
268. British Columbia Securities Commission v.
Branch, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 3.
269. R. v. Primeau,[1995] 2 S.C.R. 60.
270. R. v. Jobin, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 78.
271. Phillipsv. Nova Scotia (Commission of
Inquiry into the Westray Mine Tragedy), [1995] 2
S.C.R. 97.
272. R. v. Burlingham, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206.
273. R. v. Silveira, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297.
274. Walkerv. PrinceEdwardIsland, [1995] 2
S.C.R. 407.
275. K v. Montour, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 416.
276. Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418.
277. Egan v. Canada,[1995] 2 S.C.R. 513.
278. Thibaudeau v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R.
627.
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279. Ontariov. CanadianPacificLtd., [1995] 2
S.C.R. 1031.
280. R. v. Collins; v. Pelfrey, [1995] 2 S.C.R.
1104.
281. R. v. Pontes, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 44.
282. RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.),
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 199.
283. R. v. Wijesinha, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 422.
284. K, v. Harrer,[1995] 3 S.C.R. 562.
285. R. v. Patriquen,[1995] 4 S.C.R. 42.
286. R. v. Rogalsky, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 48.
287. R. v. Fitzpatrick, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 154.
288. Ruffo v. Conseil de la magistrature,[1995]
4 S.C.R. 267.
289. R. v. O'Connor,[1995] 4 S.C.R. 411;
A.(L.L.) v. B.(A.), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 536.
290. R. v. Evans, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8.
291. R. v. Dewald, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 68.
292. R. v. Fitt,K. v. Koutyas, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 70.
293. Mooringv. Canada(NationalParole
Board), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 75.
294. R. v. Edwards, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128.
295. R. v. Keegstra, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 458.
296. R. v. Martin, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 463.
297. UnitedStates ofAmerica v. Jamieson,
[1996] 1 S.C.R. 465.
298. UnitedStates ofAmerica v. Whitley, [1996]
1 S.C.R. 467.
299. United States ofAmerica v. Ross, [1996] 1
S.C.R. 469.
300. R. v. Burke, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 474.
301. R. v. Calder,[1996] 1 S.C.R. 660.
302. R. v. Robinson, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 683.
303. R. v. Badger,[1996] 1 S.C.R. 771.
304. Ross v. New Brunswick School DistrictNo.
15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 827.
305. R. v. Richard, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 896.
306. R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013.
307. R. v. Terry, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 207.
308. R. v. Liakas, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 286.
309. R. v. McKarris, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 287.
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312. R. v. Goldhart,[1996] 2 S.C.R. 463.
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S.C.R. 672.
315. R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723.
316. R. v. Pamajewon,[1996] 2 S.C.R. 821.
317. Harvey v. New Brunsvick (A.G.), [1996] 2
S.C.R. 876.
318. Ontario Home Builders'Associationv. York
Region Boardof Education,[1996] 2 S.C.R. 929.
319. Michaud v. Quebec (A.G.), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 3.
320. R. v.Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101.
321. R. v. C6t, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139.
322. R. v.Jacques, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 312.
323. R. v. Keshane, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 413.
324. CanadianBroadcastingCorp. v. New
Brunsvick (A.G.), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480.
325. R. v. Richard,[1996] 3 S.C.R. 525.
326. R. v. Howell, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 604.
327. R. v. Patemak,[1996] 3 S.C.R. 607.
328.Adlerv. Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609.
329. Cooperv. Canada (Human Rights
Commission), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854.
330. R. v. Finn, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 10.
331. R. v. Carosella,[1997] 1 S.C.R. 80.
332. R. v. Delaronde, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 213.
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334. Eatonv. Brant County Board of Education,
[1997] 1 S.C.R. 241.
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336. R. v. Wicksted, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 307.
337. Benner v. Canada (Secretaryof State),
[1997] 1 S.C.R. 358.
338. R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607.
339. R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13.
340. R. v. La, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 680.
341. R. v. Campbell, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3.
342. Reference Re Remuneration of Judges of
the ProvincialCourt of PrinceEdwardIsland,
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343. Reference Re Independence and
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of PrinceEdwardIsland, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3.
344. ManitobaProvincialJudgesAssn. v.
Manitoba (Ministerof Justice), [1997] 3
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Total cases = 157 (1993-1997) and
352 (1984-1997).
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APPENDIX 2
The "Court Party" Index is described in the Morton, Russell, and Riddell study
as follows:
In certain cases a choice had to be made in determining what should be called a "win" or
a "loss" for the purposes of the Court Party Index. Some cases (such as R. v. Seaboyer)
presented a clash between libertarian concerns (right to a fair trial in Seaboyer) and the
concern for a disadvantaged group (rape victims, predominately women, in Seaboyer);
Inglehart has included libertarian values in the postmaterialist rubric in addition to
minoritarian concerns. Ultimately it was decided that an outcome of the case favouring a
minoritarian position would be coded a "win." This decision was based upon the
predominance of groups concerned with minority issues within the Court Party
constituency. While some groups such as the Canadian Civil Liberties Association have
been active in supporting libertarian causes in Chartercases before the Supreme Court,
they still do not match the number of groups that support minoritarian causes or the
frequency with which these groups intervene in Chartercases before the Supreme Court
(LEAF has been the most active interest group intervener before the Supreme Court in
Chartercases).
The statistics using the Court Party Index in Table 18 are based upon these
special coding considerations for outcome of a case. The following is a list of cases
comprising the Court Party index. Beside each case name is an indication of the outcome
of the case in parentheses (w=win, l=loss, i=inconclusive). Those outcomes with an
asterisk beside them indicate that this is coded differently from the regular database. 192
198. Reference Re PublicSchools Act (Man.), s.
79(3), (4) and (7), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 839. (w)
200. Dehghaniv. Canada(Ministerof
Employment andImmigration), [1993] 1
S.C.R. 1053. (1)
204. Cunninghamv. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R.
143. (1)
207. Sauv6 v. Canada (A.G.), [1993] 2 S.C.R.
438. (w)
209. Reference Re EducationAct (Que.), [1993] 2
S.C.R. 511. (1)
214. Weatherallv. Canada (A.G.), [1993] 2
S.C.R. 872. (i)*
225. Rodriguez v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1993]
3 S.C.R. 519. (1)
228. Hy and Zel's Inc. v. Ontario (A.G.), [1993] 3
S.C.R. 675. (1)
230. Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3. (1)

231. P.(D.) v. S.(C.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 141. (I)
238. Symes v. Canada,[1993] 4 S.C.R. 695. (I)
240. ILWU, Local 500 v. Canada,[1994] 1
S.C.R. 150. (1)
242. R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701. (w)*
244. R. v. Howard, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 299. (1)
249. R. v. Tran, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 951. (w)
258. Native Women's Assn. of Canada v.
Canada,[1994] 3 S.C.R. 627. (1)
264. B.(R.) v. Children'sAid Society of
Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315. (I)
274. Walker v. PrinceEdwardIsland, [1995] 2
S.C.R. 407. (w)*
276. Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418. (w)
277. Egan v. Canada,[1995] 2 S.C.R. 513. (I)
278. Thibaudeau v. Canada,[1995] 2 S.C.R.
627. (I)

192 Morton, Russell & Riddell, supra note 4 at 59. Court Party cases for the first 195 Charter
decisions can be found in Appendix 2, ibid.
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279. Ontario v. CanadianPacific Ltd., [1995] 2
S.C.R. 1031. (w)*
289. R. v. O'Connor,[1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (1)*
289. A. (L.L.) v. B. (A.), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 536. (1)*
293. Mooring v. Canada (NationalParoleBoard),
[1996] 1 S.C.R. 75. (w)
295. R. v. Keegstra, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 458. (w)*
303. R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771. (1)
304. Ross v. New Brunswick School DistrictNo.
15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 827. (w)*
306. R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013. (w)
313. R. v. Van derPeet,[1996] 2 S.C.R. 507. (1)
314. R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd, [1996] 2
S.C.R. 672 (1)
315. R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723. (w)
316. R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821. (1)
318. Ontario Home Builders'Assn. v. York Region
Boardof Education, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 929. (1)
320. R. v.Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101. (w)
321. R. v. C6tj, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139. (w)

328. Adler v. Ontario,[1996] 3 S.C.R. 609. (1)
329. Cooperv. Canada (HumanRights
Commission), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854. (1)
334. Eaton v. BrantCounty Boardof
Education,[1997] 1 S.C.R. 241. (1)
337. Bennerv. Canada (Secretaryof State),
[1997] 1 S.C.R. 358. (w)
346. Libman v. Quebec (A.G.), [1997] 3 S.C.R.
569. (w)
347. Eldridgev.British Columbia (A.G.),
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 624. (w)
350. Godbout v.Longueuil (City of), [1997] 3
S.C.R. 844. (i)
352. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3
S.C.R. 1010. (w)

Total cases = 80 (44 cases from 1993
to 1997). The case numbers
correspond to the list of cases
contained in Appendix 1, above.
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